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ABSTRACT  
 
 
For those who have an interest in targeting, neutralizing, detaining, and 
adjudicating terrorists amidst the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), few 
tools are more poorly understood than the acquisition and subsequent 
movement of the alleged terrorists.  Rendition is that process by which the 
body of an individual is taken from State A to State B.  It may occur in either 
a “regular” or an “irregular” form.  Regular rendition occurs when the 
individual is moved pursuant to the express terms and procedures of a given 
extradition treaty.  Irregular rendition, on the other hand, is principally 
comprised of the rare instances in which an individual is moved in lieu of, 
outside of, or in spite of an extradition treaty.  These irregular forms of 
rendition can generally be classified into four categories: (a) Luring/Trickery, 
(b) Deportation as de facto Extradition, (c) Forcible Abductions for 
Prosecution, and (d) 3rd Party Interrogative Renditions.  Although many of the 
irregular rendition models have strong similarities in law, each has its own 
unique twists.  The following thesis aims to draw further upon the legal 
authorities relative to two of these irregular rendition models and provide a 
legal and political framework for their use within the analytical context of the 
GWOT.  Comprised of two distinct monographs, this thesis project first 
addresses state-sponsored forcible abductions as they are utilized within the 
criminal field for prosecution and then moves to review their use within the 
intelligence arena for the purposes of interrogation.  Where extraterritorial 
forcible abductions have been lawfully used by members of the law 
enforcement community since the late nineteenth century, the shift in 
paradigm toward their use for interrogations carried out by a third party under 
the Clinton Administration is more questionable both politically and 
jurisprudentially. 
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-  PREFACE -  
 
 I have long since possessed something of an unhealthy fascination with 
terrorism; with the strategic and tactical aspirations of disenchanted zealotry 
untethered in an orgy of violence.  The fluency with which transnational criminal 
networks converge in a world metaphorically under the one we know, and the 
irregular methods by which our institutions attempt to fight back, present an 
endlessly multidimensional problem in a contextual political system dominated by 
states.  How can society neutralize these threats?  What instruments are available? 
 11 September 2001 did not construct the landscape anew.  Instead, what 
changed was the awareness of the threats and of the countermeasures long used to 
defeat them.  Thumbing through a dilapidated 1973 edition of M. Cherif 
Bassiouni’s International Terrorism and Political Crimes four years ago, I came 
across an interesting entry: state-sponsored kidnapping.  Needless to say, I was 
intrigued.  It resonated with a dictatorial tone, sounding something akin to what 
might have been expected from the Libyans in the mid-1980s or long pursued by 
the North Korean regime in selective retaliation against the South.  And yet this 
authoritative volume was from a time well before.  Little did I know that state-
sponsored kidnapping was an activity utilized by the American law enforcement 
community since the middle of nineteenth century.  And that the recent genesis of 
its use as an antiterrorism measure had bequeathed an altogether more elusive 
concept, forcible kidnapping for clandestine interrogations in another part of the 
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world.  Through a felicitous marriage between the lure of international terrorism 
and the practical pull of a legal framework, I found a topic worth investigating.   
 Research formally began in December of 2003.  Engaging in intellectual 
inquiry in a topic as multifaceted and complex as this is difficult at any level, but 
without formal legal training a jurisprudential review was itself an especially 
daunting task from the outset.  Thus began my groundwork in a systematic 
outlining and study of Professor Banks’ full National Security Law casebook, in 
addition to a thorough reading and outlining of Louis Fisher’s Presidential War 
Power, over nights and weekends.  The shear number of evenings spent at the 
local Starbucks could undoubtedly credit me with single-handedly securing a full-
time position for a fellow college student working behind the counter.  Once I had 
a relatively sturdy comprehension of the legal base, I moved on to learning about 
the law of international extradition and mutual legal assistance.  With time, over 
the following year, as I balanced work, school, and a insatiable appetite for 
reeling through volume after volume on al-Qa’eda and related topics with gaining 
the requisite background for producing the project now before you, I became 
sufficiently versed in the topic that I could engage practitioners in and out of 
government around the country, and indeed around the world.  And so I did.  
Talking with members of the American defense establishment, special agents with 
the FBI, academics, and American and British lawyers, I quickly got a handle on 
the topic from myriad perspectives.   
 And then, something happened.  Much to my dismay, the story broke of a 
clandestine program for the rendering of suspects to other countries for purposes 
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of interrogation, dubbed by the media “extraordinary rendition.”  What was once 
a scarcely known area of intelligence and criminal extradition law quickly became 
an international incident, plastered across the front pages of every reputable 
newspaper around the Western world.  Disgruntled that I might have missed my 
one opportunity to provide among the first full analyses of the topic, I decided to 
dig in.  Having now read through thousands of pages of reports, news articles, 
books, cases, and law journal articles, bantered with experts, and walked the 
streets of northern Milan, where one incident is said to have occurred, I found 
myself drowning for air in a sea of information.  Sometimes, I learned, too much 
information can be problem without the hard reality of time to give it form.   
 What results below makes no claim to exhaustive review.  That would 
require a full book.  It is, instead, merely one narrow perspective seeking 
principally to answer whether forcible abductions can be used, as a matter of law, 
and then an evaluation of whether they should be used, as a matter of policy.  For 
it is within the confluence of legal objectivism and political subjectivity that 
practical choices are made. 
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Kidnapping Terrorists: Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions in the Global War on Terrorism - Monograph 1 
Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions for Prosecution 
 
The following is the first monograph of a two part series on the use of 
extraterritorial “forcible abductions” within the Global War On Terrorism 
(GWOT).  This monograph discusses their use to effectuate criminal prosecution 
within the United States. 
 
I. Introduction 
 A. Methods of Forcible Abductions 
Perhaps the most widely discussed irregular form of rendition is that of 
forcible abduction; that is, the kidnapping of an individual in one country for 
purposes of transferring him to a second country to be tried for certain alleged 
criminal conduct.1  This rendition may occur in one of four ways: (a) with the 
assistance or connivance of agents in which the action takes place, (b) by officers 
of one state acting within the territorial boundaries of another state, (c) by 
vigilante private citizens working in a private capacity, or (d) by private citizens 
working at the behest of the seeking state.  
The first of these methods is that form of forcible abduction which comes 
by way of assistance or connivance by agents of the host state –that is, the state 
from where the suspect would be rendered.  Typically this method is reserved as a 
form of “informal extradition,” in which the host state desires to provide 
extradition where the specific terms of the given extradition treaty would 
otherwise prohibit it, or where no treaty of extradition exists.2  The legal basis for 
this form of rendition rests in law enforcement’s customary authority to locate and 
arrest criminals pursuant to indictment, or in the rare circumstances of pre-
                                                 
1 Dycus, et al, ed, National Security Law, 3rd Edition, Aspen Publishers, New York, New York, 2002.  p.851 
2 Id. 
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indictment detention as combatants, under the material witness statute,3 or under 
general probable cause requirements of warrantless arrest.4  Consequently, when 
conducting forcible abductions abroad, federal agents act under color of law as 
authorized agents of the law enforcement community, typically taking place only 
with authorization of the Attorney General or his designee.   
 The second method of forcible abduction is also carried out by officers of 
the seeking state acting within the territorial boundaries of the host state, but 
without its consent.5  Like the actions which include host state connivance, this 
form of abduction is derived from the extension of extraterritorial law 
enforcement powers.  Indeed, the only material distinction between this form of 
abduction and the previous form is its overt infringement upon the territorial 
sovereignty of the host state.  Taking such action is undoubtedly politically 
precarious and poses difficult questions of legality. 
 The third method of forcible abductions comes by way of vigilante private 
citizens working in a private capacity.6  On a practical level, as can be expected, 
this form of abduction may itself be further distinguished, between those private 
individuals who are citizens of the host state and those who come from outside of 
its territory to carry out the operation.  But as a matter of law, at least as far as the 
                                                 
3 18 U.S.C. § 3144; See also: McNabb Associates, P.C., “When Intelligence Agents Come Calling… You 
May Be Held Under the Material Witness Statute,” accessed online via:  
http://www.nationalsecuritycrimes.com/material-witne ss.htm. 
4 See generally: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 4(c); also discussed below. 
5 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 4th 2002 Edition, Oceana 
Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1996. p.217-295 
6 Id. 
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United States may be concerned, this distinction is not altogether fruitful; a 
vigilante is a vigilante, in either case.7   
 A final method, much like the vigilante, is the abduction of a suspect by 
private citizens working at the behest of the seeking state.8  This model of 
abduction is something of an amalgam between the second and third, in which the 
individual actor is both a private citizen but also an agent of the seeking state.  
Typical use occurs when the seeking state wishes to act under the guise of 
plausible deniability, arguing publicly that it didn’t actively try to get the suspect, 
but when it “happens to have him” in custody, a criminal prosecution may 
proceed. 
 
 B. Genesis of Forcible Abductions 
 Forcible abductions are not new.  In fact, it can be said, the United States 
has relied on forcible adductions to effectuate arrests in some form or fashion 
since the middle of the nineteenth century.  The Supreme Court first faced the 
issue in 1876, when American law enforcement arrested alleged John Wilkes 
Booth co-conspirator John Surratt after fleeing to Alexandria, Egypt.9  Such an 
instance was again seen before the court a decade later, where an individual 
charged with white collar crimes in Illinois was forcibly abducted from Lima, 
                                                 
7 This may not be entirely true in the case of bounty hunters who act domestically (see: Taylor v. Taintor, 83 
U.S. 366 (1872)) but it does apply with regard to extraterritorial arrests (see: Reese v. United States, 76 US 
13, 19 L.Ed. 541 (1869)).  As a vigilante conducting a forcible abduction extraterritorially, one may be 
particularly subject to criminal prosecution in the host state, and may be extradited from the United States for 
that purpose (see: Kear v. Hilton, 4th Cir., 699 F.2d 181 (1983)). 
8 Id. 
9 Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875). 
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Peru.10  Some sixty-six years after the Ker decision, the Supreme Court would 
hear a third case involving forcible abductions, this time between two American 
states.11  These cases, when taken together, established a firm orthodoxy in 
American legal practice, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, under which forcible 
abductions became an accepted instrument of long-arm criminal law enforcement.  
Due Process, under this original rule, was conceived as applying only to those 
elements which make for a fair trial, rather than the manner in which one is 
brought to court.12  Since its establishment however, the scope of Due Process 
protection has expanded immensely, now covering not only the right to a fair trial, 
but even pre-indictment and pre-trial considerations which bar either prosecution 
or the use of particular evidence.13  This expansion of general Due Process has 
generally not been extended to overcome the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.  During this 
time though, use of forcible abductions was truly irregular.  Neither policy nor 
doctrine suggested its use.  It was, as a result, an exception carved largely as 
incident rather than policy.  Threats of international terrorism shifted this posture.  
 Throughout the mid-1980s, Department of Justice policy fell in 
accordance with an internal legal memorandum, finding that Executive branch 
officials “have no law enforcement authority in another nation unless it is the 
product of that nation’s consent.”14  Abductions, under this jurisprudence, were 
not to be conducted without the consent of the host state.  Experience with 
                                                 
10 Ker v. People of the State of Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225 (1886). 
11  Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 (1952). 
12 Supra Ker v. Illinois 
13 Supra Bassiouni 
14 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum 543, March 13, 1980, as quoted by: Jenkins, 
Vlad, “Bringing Terror to Justice: The Extra-Territorial Arrest of Fawaz Yunis,” Kennedy School of 
Government Case Program, C16-90-960.0, p.5. 
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international terrorism during the Reagan years corroded that presumption.  Fresh 
from fiascos like the hijacking of the Achille Lauro15 and Germany’s 
unwillingness to extradite TWA Flight 847 hijacker Mohammad Hamadei,16 a 
growing sense of frustration built over apparent foreign governments’ 
unwillingness to cooperate in antiterrorism law enforcement.  Some policymakers 
also feared that suspected terrorists in some states could not be extradited, due to 
a liberal interpretation of the political offense exception found in most treaties.17 
Drawing from the long historical record of forcible abductions and an emergent 
Congressional push to expand extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases of international 
terrorism,18 some within the Reagan Administration sought to reverse the Justice 
Department’s position.19  In 1989, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department 
issued a second memorandum, authorizing the FBI to “use its statutory authority 
to investigate and arrest individuals for violating United States law, even if the 
FBI’s actions contravene customary international law.”20  Growing jurisprudential 
acceptance of forcible abductions in cases of terrorist prosecutions finally 
surfaced in the administration of George H.W. Bush.  Under still classified 
National Security Directive 77 (NSD-77), President Bush provided procedural 
                                                 
15 For more see: Bohn, Michael K., The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of 
Terrorism,  Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. 
16 Supra Jenkins 
17 Fitzpatrick, Joan, “Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond,” 
Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 457, 
Summer 2003, p.5; See the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977), Europ. T.S. No. 
90, 15 I.L.M. 1272, for an example of a counterterrorism treaty void of a political offense exception.  Note, a 
number of extradition treaties have been renegotiated to narrow the scope of the political offense exception.  
Likewise, there appears to be a trend toward reinterpreting what is meant by the political offense exception, 
so as to exclude terrorism as being “politically motivated.”  Id. 
18 See Generally: 18 U.S.C. §2331 (establishing long-arm jurisdiction for the taking of U.S. hostages abroad, 
hijacking of U.S. aircraft, or actions which threaten American interests abroad) and 18 U.S.C. §1203 
(providing for criminal jurisdiction over persons who committed terrorist acts abroad and are “found to be” 
present within the United States). 
19 Supra Jenkins 
20 Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, “Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
Override International Law In Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities,” June 21, 1989. 
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guidelines relative to the appropriate forceful measures to effectuate an 
extraterritorial non-consensual arrest.21  It was under this authority that forcible 
abductions of suspected narcotics dealers were executed in Mexico.22  President 
Clinton went one step further.  Shortly after the 1995 Murrah Federal Building 
bombing in Okalahoma City, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision 
Directive 39 (PDD-39), clarifying the legal instruments available for deterring, 
defeating, and responding to acts of terrorism against the United States.23  Under 
PDD-39, federal law enforcement is tasked to “vigorously apply extraterritorial 
statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United 
States,” as “a matter of the highest priority…”24  Before the tool of forcible 
abduction may be utilized under PDD-39 however, law enforcement bureaus are 
compelled to “take appropriate measures to induce cooperation.”25  Although the 
scope of what measures may be deemed sufficiently appropriate remains unclear, 
they may be interpreted to include economic and diplomatic sanctions.26  
Connivance of the host state would first be sought and, if those efforts failed, non-
consensual abductions would follow.  A clear reversal of previous policy. 
One early application of this authority for counterterrorism took place at 7 
AM on February 7, 1995, as four FBI Agents, one DEA agent, and seven heavily 
armed Pakistani special forces soldiers burst, guns drawn, into Room 16 of the 
                                                 
21 Although NSD-77 remains classified, inclusion within the below-discussed Presidential Decision Directive 
39 of a reference to NSD-77 as providing the procedures for these activities serves to verify its content. 
22 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992). 
23 Presidential Decision Directive-39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Slater, Matthew A., “Trumpeting Justice: The Implications of U.S. Law and Policy for the International 
Rendition of Terrorists From Failed or Uncooperative States,” International and Comparative Law Review, 
University of Miami, 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 151, p.6. 
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Su-Casa guesthouse in mid-town Islamabad.27  Once in, they quickly tackled, 
bound, gagged, and hooded the suspect, and shortly thereafter placed him onto a 
U.S. Air Force 707 military jet headed directly for New York.28  The suspect, a 
one Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was an infamous professional international terrorist, 
an indicted co-conspirator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing29 and the 
mastermind of numerous other plots to, inter alia, assassinate an American 
President, assassinate Pope John Paul II, bomb national landmarks in New York 
and Washington, D.C., and detonate explosives aboard some twelve American 
airliners traveling over international waters around the world.30  Pakistani 
government officials “bent over backwards” to assist American agents in the 
Yousef abduction, namely because then-Prime Minister Benzanir Bhutto wished 
to show that she was “tough on terrorism.”31  Of course, this instance of abduction 
was equally the product of American action as it was Pakistani action, but in some 
instances of connivance, the hose state acts exclusively, though at the request of 
the seeking state.  According to reports, similar plans were devised for the 
forcible abduction of lead terrorist operator Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) in 
Doha, Qatar and Usama bin Ladin (UBL) at Tarnak Farms, Afghanistan.32 
 In May of 1998, the Clinton Administration again reiterated its recognition 
of extraterritorial forcible abductions as an instrument of counterterrorism by 
                                                 
27 Reeve, Simon, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism, 
Northeastern University Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 2002. p. 101-110. 
28Id.; Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Books, New York, New York, 2004. p.272-274 . 
29 United States v. Yousef,, 2d. Cir., 327 F.3d 56 (2003). 
30 Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Random House Publishing, New York, NY, 
2002. 
31 Supra Reeve, p. 103 
32 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Diplomacy,” Staff Statement No. 5, 
p.2-4.  
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issuing PDD-62.  Although still classified, open source material indicates that it 
includes ten policy agendas toward countering terrorism, among which the 
“Apprehension, Extradition, Rendition, and Prosecution” of international 
terrorists tops the list.33  Through nearly a decade of growing pains, issuance 
PDD-62 marked a watershed point; forcible abductions had become an accepted 
policy instrument within the counterterrorism community.34 
 11 September 2001 caused a fundamental pivot point in the genesis of the 
forcible abduction instrument.  Prior to that time, counterterrorism fell largely 
within the sphere of criminal enforcement.  Renditions of all stripes were 
exclusively comprehended as instruments for prosecution, not combatant 
detention or interrogative purposes.  Although air piracy,35 use of the four aircraft 
as weapons of mass destruction,36 transnational terrorism,37 murder of 
government officials,38 destruction of government property,39 and conspiracy40 are 
all federal crimes, all three branches of government took those actions to qualify 
as acts of war.41  In this sense, then, the whole is of greater significance than the 
sum of its parts.  The nation is at war, and at war with al-Qa’eda and those 
affiliate movements and organizations which directly threaten the United States 
and its interests.  Because the war is understood to extend beyond those 
immediate actions and into the realm of general warfare, counterterrorism 
                                                 
33 Id. p.7. 
34 Importantly, plans involving the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of forcible abductions for intelligence 
purposes also arose at this point, as discussed in the second monograph of this article. 
35 49 U.S.C. App. 1472 
36 18 U.S.C. §2332a 
37 18 U.S.C. §2339b 
38 18 U.S.C. §115 
39 18 U.S.C. §1361 
40 18 U.S.C. §371 
41 Notably, Congress recognized this state of war by passing an Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) shortly after September 11th. 
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operations may lay within both the province of criminal law or that of armed 
conflict.  To date, most activity conducted against the al-Qa’eda network favors 
intelligence, covert action, and armed conflict, rather than law enforcement.  As a 
result, forcible abductions for the purposes of criminal prosecution within the 
context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) may remain in temporary hiatus 
until such time as criminal law is again the favored instrument.  In any case, the 
policy if not exercised, still remains.  But, whatever the established practice, a 
legal synthesis is no less warranted.  
 
II. Constitutional Framework 
 In executing extraterritorial forcible abductions against international 
terrorists within the GWOT, the President relies upon four distinct Constitutional 
authorities: (a) Chief Executive, (b) Commander-in-Chief, (c) Customary 
Executive Practice, and (d) Foreign Relations Authority. 
 
A. Chief Executive Authority and Extraterritorial Forcible 
Abductions 
 
Law enforcement is, without a doubt, an essential part of the Executive 
function.  The scope of that authority’s exercise extraterritorially is defined in part 
by its jurisdiction.  As it relates in most contexts, it is a “longstanding principle of 
American law” that legislation passed by Congress is presumed not to apply 
extraterritorially unless expressly stated otherwise.42  Within the province of 
                                                 
42 Courts also maintain the authority to hear habeas corpus claims in spite of a territorial nexus, see 
generally: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company, 499 U.S. 244, 114 L.Ed.2d 274, 11 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).   
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criminal enforcement, extraterritorial jurisdiction is recognized in one of four 
contexts,43 following the protective principle, the nationality principle, the passive 
personality principle and that of universality.44   
Under the protective principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a state is 
granted the right of prosecution when the actions of an alleged criminal threaten 
its critical functions.  Although the scope of the principle is decidedly subjective, 
dependent upon interpretation of state interests, it is often best defined as listed 
within treaties of extradition and issue-specific conventions.45  Given the nature of 
threat posed by international terrorism, the protective principle has been deemed 
applicable.46  The nationality principle, otherwise known as the principle of active 
personality,47 permits a state to assert jurisdiction over its own nationals acting 
abroad.  It is not the general practice of Congress to include, or imply, criminal 
jurisdiction on this score, though use of general extraterritorial clauses may be 
read to do so.48  Whereas the active personality principle asserts jurisdiction 
relative to the nationality of the alleged criminal offender, the principle of passive 
personality asserts jurisdiction relative to the nationality of the victim.49 Although 
early 20th century exercise of this principle was opposed ardently by common law 
                                                                                                                                     
They may also stretch to find such jurisdiction, see generally: Rasul v. United States, 72 U.S.L.W 4596 
(2004). 
43 The chief form of jurisdiction falls within the principle of territoriality.  As one court has noted, “[a]ll the 
nations of the world recognize the principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a 
force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done,” Rivard v. United States, 5th Cir., 
375 F.2d 882, 887 (1967).  Territoriality has been conceptually expanded by significant proportions, 
particularly when applying conspiracy statutes.  See generally: United States v. Ricardo, 5th Cir., 619 F.2d 
1124 (1980).  A second species of territoriality, namely objective territoriality, is also recognized, although is 
generally considered inapplicable to terrorism related offenses.  See: Supra Dycus et al, p.842. 
44 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 (1986), RESTAT FOREIGN 
REL THIRD 432; See also: Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d. 1308 (1984). 
45 United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (1985). 
46 Supra United States v. Yousef  
47 Supra Bantekas p.151; See also United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 (1986). 
48 Watson, G.R.  “Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction,” Yale Journal of 
International Law, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. (1992). 
49 Supra Bantekas p.152-154; See also: United States v. Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d 601 (1998). 
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countries,50 Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-
Terrorism Act in 1986 granting federal courts jurisdiction in cases of 
extraterritorial murder of American citizens.51  Assertion of passive personality 
jurisdiction has been upheld in court52 and reiterated by further statutes.53  The 
principle of universality, unlike the protective principle, requires no substantive 
nexus with the United States, its citizens, or its national interests.54  Instead, under 
assertion of universal jurisdiction, as British Attorney General Lord Peter 
Goldsmith has asserted, “there are some crimes which are so heinous, such an 
affront to justice, that they can be tried in any country.”55  There are those who 
contend that terrorism, like slavery,56 piracy,57 or crimes against humanity,58 pose 
such considerable threat to the greater whole of mankind that any court at any 
time and in any place maintains jurisdiction to try the alleged offender.59  But this 
interpretation is not widely accepted.  In prosecuting rendered terrorist Ramzi 
Yousef, the government relied upon an assertion of universal jurisdiction for 
terrorism related offenses, a claim which was promptly reversed by the Second 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 United States v. Yunis, D.C. Cir., 924 F.2d 1086 (1988) 
53 See, for instance, 49 U.S.C. §1472(n) 
54 See generally: Randall, Kenneth C., “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,” University of Texas 
Law Review, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785 (1988) and Abramovsky, Abraham, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The 
United States’ Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in United States v. Yunis,.” Yale Journal of 
International Law, 15 Yale J. Int’l L. 121 (1990).  
55 As quoted in: “UK Court Convicts Afghan Warlord of ‘heinous’ Crimes,” The Guardian, Monday, July 18, 
2005. 
56 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes,” 59 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 63 (Autumn 1996). 
57 Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J., separate opinion 
of Judge Guillaume (limiting universal jurisdiction to the crime of piracy). 
58 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. 
59 See Robertson, Geoffrey, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, New Press, January 
2003. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals.60  Terrorism, the court found, can scarcely be defined, 
to say nothing of being universally condemned.61 
Although most criminal statutes providing for extraterritorial application 
do so only generally, the wealth of Congressional actions and treaties providing 
such jurisdiction in terrorism-related cases can be read to underscore 
Congressional assent therein.  The question is left to what species of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may apply.  With respect to terrorism prosecutions, the 
most probable forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction will likely entail the protective 
and passive personality principles.   
Whether jurisdiction be recognized through the protective or passive 
personality principles, law enforcement bureaus are tasked with the express 
authority to investigate alleged criminal conduct, detain, and refer cases for 
prosecution.62  Obtaining the body, in this sense then, is an intrinsic necessity of 
performing the law enforcement function.  No court holds within its competence 
the authority to issue an arrest warrant for a non-citizen extraterritorially.63  
Members of the law enforcement community, however, are not bound exclusively 
by a warrant to effectuate an arrest.  Warrantless arrests, according to that rule, 
may take place “when an officer has probable cause to believe a suspect has 
committed a felony.”64  Typically, such an action would follow both the issuance 
                                                 
60 Supra United States v. Yousef  
61 Id. 
62 FBI’s arrest authority may be found at: 28 U.S.C §533(1) and 18 U.S.C. §3052.  DEA’s authority may 
similarly be found at: 21 U.S.C. §878, but this authority relies upon a presumption against extraterritorial 
application (see: supra Alvarez-Machain). 
63 18 U.S.C. §3041-3042 grants courts the authority to issue extraterritorial arrest warrants only to United 
States citizens and nations who are fugitives from justice and charged with or convicted of a federal crime; 
Supra Abbell. 
64 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4(C).; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 421 n. 11, 96 
S. Ct. 820, 47 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct.280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). 
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of an arrest warrant and perhaps an INTERPOL Red Notice.65  Further, operating 
under the Department of Justice’s 1989 memorandum regarding extraterritorial 
law enforcement activities,66 law enforcement officers would be supported both 
by acts of Congress and internal Executive memoranda.  In those instances where 
the Executive and Legislative departments are of one mind, Presidential 
Executive authority is at its zenith.67 
 
B. Commander-in-Chief Authority in GWOT Abductions 
Although the actions of the Executive in conducting extraterritorial 
forcible abductions revolve principally around law enforcement, like in the cases 
of luring68 and expulsion,69 and do not appear to materially involve intelligence or 
military applications of force, Commander-in-Chief authority would appear 
limited on first blush.  Invocation of Commander-in-Chief status, as conceived in 
modern times, is scarcely relevant to the application of force for reasons other 
than the protection of the United States or its vital interests.  But, as we have seen 
in the years following the initiation of hostilities, threat neutralization relative to 
international terrorism comes on myriad dimensions.  Law enforcement is one.  
As a consequence, the President would no doubt contend, courts are therefore 
                                                 
65 An international Red Notice refers to a posting listed by INTERPOL headquarters and disseminated to the 
National Central Bureaus (NCBs) of all member states, requesting the arrest of a particular individual, 
generally for particularly heinous crimes.  For more on the INTERPOL Notice System see: McNabb 
Associates, P.C., “Interpol” at: 
http://www.internationalextradition.com/interpol.htm; See also: Michael Abbell, Obtaining Evidence Abroad 
in Criminal Cases, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY, 2004.p.§1-8 -§1-11. 
66 Supra Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, June 21, 1989. 
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), (hereinafter: Steel Seizure Case), 
concurring opinion J. Jackson. 
68 Supra Bassiouni 
69 Id.; McNabb, Douglas C. and Matthew R. McNabb. “And the Gloves Came Off,” The European Lawyer.  
October 2005.  p.38-39. 
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bound to “indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President’s] 
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when 
turned against the outside world.”70  Latitude, in so far as the Commander-in-
Chief authority is concerned, is limited to the exertion of force for protecting its 
own, enveloped by the protective principle of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. 
But exercise of this force does not come without Congressionally 
mandated parameters.  After all, the Supreme Court has noted, “we submit 
ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”71  Congress, and not the President, is 
vested with the sovereign authority to declare war, establish the laws applicable in 
that war, grant letters of marque and reprisal to private citizens in conducting 
those actions, make rules concerning captures on land and sea, and to make all 
other laws necessary and proper to fulfill such functions.72  Although law 
enforcement may be considered a species of threat neutralization, the parameters 
of its exercise have been rightly circumscribed by Congress.  Unless the post 11 
September 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)73 were to 
be read as an unprecedented expansion of Presidential authorities beyond 
traditional instruments of force, haphazardly bleeding the line between the 
exacting of military strength and law enforcement responsibilities, Commander-
in-Chief authority independent of the Executive function cannot be found. 
 
C. Customary Executive Practice 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Constitution of the United States of America, Article I Sec.8  
73 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 107th Congress, Public Law 107-40 [S. J. RES. 23], 
September 18, 2001. 
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Executive agencies have utilized extraterritorial forcible abductions as an 
instrument of criminal prosecution for well over a century.74  At no time in this 
long history of its practice has Congress objected.  According to the Supreme 
Court in the Steel Seizures case, in order for any given action to rise to the level of 
extraconstitutional gloss of Presidential power, it must consist in “a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and 
never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold 
the Constitution.”75  For most of its history, extraterritorial forcible abductions 
were aberrations to standard practice.  But, with the progressive reversal in that 
posture outlined previously, into an overt policy with regard to counterterrorism, 
it would appear that such a custom is present.  Executive custom, however, is not 
sufficient authority in and of itself.  No President can claim to act solely on the 
basis of a past record laid by Presidents passed, were no Constitutional basis 
found.76   
 
D. Foreign Relations Authority 
Presidential authority in the field of foreign affairs is derived, inter alia, 
from the President’s duty to appoint Ambassadors and other officials to negotiate 
treaties on behalf of the United States.77  Federal authority appears traditionally to 
have been considered “in origin and essential character different from that over 
                                                 
74 The record dates back no later than to Supra Shuey 
75 Supra Steel Seizure Case 
76 See generally: Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (noting that customary gloss on Presidential power is 
limited by the powers expressly recognized within the Constitution) and Home Building & Loan Association 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (applying the same limitations to so-called “Inherent Emergency Powers” 
of the President). 
77 Art. II Sec. 2 Constitution of the United States of America 
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internal affairs.”78  But while “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved,”79  in the case of forcible abductions utilized with the end of criminal 
prosecution in mind, both law enforcement and foreign affairs are implicated.  
Indeed, though diplomatic relations are no doubt affected, the root and cause of 
such actions are derived within the sphere of domestic policy.  As such, 
Presidential authority must be found elsewhere. 
 
III. Statutory Challenges 
 Forcible abductions for prosecution face a number of statutory difficulties.  
First among these challenges is the federal kidnapping statute, which expressly 
provides for prosecution against any individual who “unlawfully seizes, confines, 
inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts or carries away and holds for ransom or 
reward,”80 carrying up to life in prison81 without parole.82  The statute’s 
prohibition extends both domestically and extraterritorially.83  
 Transposing this framework over the four variable fact-patterns discussed 
previously, it would appear that when the law enforcement community acts either 
with the connivance of the host state or on its own independent authority, the 
federal kidnapping statute would not apply.  As noted previously, Rule 4(C) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implies legal permissibility of extraterritorial 
arrests in the cases at hand.  Should a private individual act in a private capacity 
                                                 
78 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
79 Id. 
80 18 U.S.C. 1201(a) 
81 Id. 
82 Parole was abolished within the Federal System in 1987. 
83 Supra 18 U.S.C. 1201(a) 
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however, there can be little doubt that they remain eligible for prosecution under 
the statute; a vigilante is a vigilante.  It is unclear though, as to whether a private 
individual, acting through contract with American law officials, perhaps having 
be deputized, could have criminal exposure for his actions.  Within this 
intelligence arena such actors are known as “dirty assets,”84 but use of private 
individuals who act at the behest of the law enforcement community is even more 
common, guided under Attorney General Guidelines relative to the use of 
confidential informants.85  Under these guidelines, no member of the law 
enforcement community is permitted to authorize a confidential informant to 
“participate in an act of violence,”86 or to “participate in an act designed to obtain 
information… that would be unlawful if conducted by a law enforcement 
agent.”87  Forcible kidnapping is a crime of violence.88  Thus, it would appear, no 
law enforcement official maintains the authority to use confidential informants for 
the purposes of extraterritorial forcible abductions or the interrogation therein. 
  
IV. Constitutional Challenge of Due Process 
 Of the provisions in the Constitution which might be used to prohibit 
forcible abductions as a method for bringing a suspect into a given jurisdiction, 
the most troublesome is that of Due Process.  The Fifth Amendment provides that 
                                                 
84 See generally: Hitz, Frederick P.  “Unleashing the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and Letting the CIA be 
the CIA,” 25 Harv. J. Law and Pub. Pol. 765, 765-66 (2002); Thomas Baugher, “Swans Swimming in the 
Sewer: Legal Use of “Dirty Assets” by CIA,” Int’L J. of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol. 9 No. 4 
435, 457 (1996).  
85 Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants, accessed online via:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/dojguidelines.pdf 
86Id. AG Guidelines III(C)(1)(b)(i) p.25. 
87 Id. AG Guidelines III(C)(1)(b)(i) p.25. 
88 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §4B1.2; For more on federal sentencing issues relative to 
kidnapping see: Id. §2A4.1. 
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no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law,” as does the Fourteenth Amendment place a similar restriction on the states.  
Collectively taken, the Due Process requirement constitutes a bedrock principle of 
equitability in the criminal process.89   
 The first watershed case involving any model of forcible abduction 
reached the Supreme Court in 1886, in Ker v. Illinois.90  Defendant Federick Ker, 
while living in Peru, was indicted by an Illinois grand jury for larceny and 
embezzlement.  After prodding by the Governor of Illinois at the time, President 
Andrew Johnson invoked the treaty of extradition between the United States and 
Peru by authorizing a Pinkerton Agent –a private security firm predating the 
Secret Service –to take custody of Ker from Peruvian authorities.  Upon arrival 
however, the Pinkerton Agent quickly learned that, in the midst of war, the 
Peruvian capital city of Lima had been taken over by Chile.  Instead of resorting 
to the long, troublesome process of extradition with either former Peruvian 
authorities or newly anointed Chilean officials, the agent forcibly abducted Ker, 
placed him onto a nearby boat, and took him back to the United States.  Ker 
promptly sought for the court to divest itself of jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court, 
on appeal, ruled that the principal issue of concern was not that of procedures 
taken to bring Ker to court, but instead revolved around whether or not the trial 
                                                 
89 It is important to note here that a distinction has been drawn between extraterritorial application of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  See especially: United States v. bin Ladin, S.D.N.Y., 132 F.Supp.2d 168 
(2001); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
90 Supra Ker v. Illinois 
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itself was sufficiently fair.91  Abduction was, as the district court held, a “mere 
irregularity” in procedure, insufficient to vitiate criminal jurisdiction.92   
 Some sixty-six years after the Ker decision, the Supreme Court heard 
another case involving abductions, Frisbie v. Collins.  A Michigan state prisoner, 
on petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleged that he had been abducted in 
Chicago and brought back to Michigan to stand trial by Michigan police officers 
who had traveled there for that explicit purpose.  The Supreme Court went on to 
uphold the Ker interpretation in holding that the sole factors in determining Due 
Process were “satisfied when one present in court is convicted of a crime after 
being fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance 
with Constitutional procedural safeguards.”93  “There is nothing in the 
Constitution,” the Court reasoned, “that requires a court to permit a guilty person 
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his 
will.”94 
Thus, under the newly accrued Ker-Frisbie doctrine, Due Process 
extended only to a fair trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction over 
the person was obtained.  The judicial posture eventually came to be encapsulated 
in the maxim:  male captus bene detentus –poorly captured, well detained, or the 
“Tough Luck Rule.”95  Interestingly though, since Frisbie, the scope of the Due 
Process clause in other areas has expanded immensely, now covering not only the 
right to a fair trial, but even pre-indictment and pre-trial considerations which bar 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Supra Frisbie v. Collins 
94 Id, 
95 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 4th 2002 Edition, Oceana 
Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1996. p.217-295 (Hereinafter: Bassiouni 4th Edition) 
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either prosecution or the use of particular discovery.  This expansion of general 
Due Process–with the exception of one case–has yet to extend to the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine, however. 
This exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine did not come until 1974, when 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the scandalous case of a one 
Francisco Toscanino,96 establishing the first “shock the conscience” exception. 
Toscanino, along with four others, was charged in the Eastern District of 
New York with conspiracy to import drugs.97  According to Toscanino, pursuant 
to the indictment, members of the Montevideo police, acting as paid agents of the 
United States, lured him from his home in Montevideo.98  As agreed, they met at a 
deserted bowling alley whereupon Toscanino was abducted, knocked 
unconscious, blindfolded, gagged, and thrown into the back of a car, and 
subsequently driven to the Uruguay-Brazil border.99  When they reached Brazil, 
the kidnappers (members of the Montevideo police) handed him over to a group 
of Brazilians who proceeded to interrogate and torture him for some fourteen 
days.100  Torture included the injection of fluids in his eyes and nose, electric 
shock administered to his ears, toes, and genitals, prolonged denial of sleep, and 
severe physical beatings.101  During this period of torture, the US Attorney for the 
Eastern District of New York prosecuting the case surprisingly received progress 
reports on the effectiveness of the interrogation.102  Toscanino was held 
                                                 
96 United States v. Toscanino, 2nd Cir., 500 F.2d 267 (1974). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Supra Bassiouni 
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incommunicado and was repeatedly denied requests to speak with any member of 
his family, the Uruguayan embassy, or a lawyer. 103 Eventually, he was taken to 
Rio de Janeiro, where he was drugged and placed on a flight to New York in the 
custody of U.S. agents.  According to the Second Circuit, the treatment of 
Toscanino could not be reconciled with the expanded notion of Due Process, 
claiming that a court must 
 
divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a 
defendant where it had been acquired as the result of 
the government’s deliberate, unnecessary, and 
unreasonable invasion of the accused’s Constitutional 
rights.104 
 
Under this precedent, in order to divest itself of jurisdiction on Due Process 
grounds, a court must certify that the conduct be “of the most outrageous and 
reprehensible kind.”105 
It would not even be one year later however, that the same court found the 
exception to be extremely narrow.  In this case, defendant Lujan was charged with 
eight others in conspiracy to import and distribute large quantities of heroin in the 
United States.106  U.S. agents flew to Argentina undercover and asked the 
defendant (a licensed pilot) to fly them to Bolivia for the ostensible purposes of 
conducting business.107  Once in Bolivia, the Bolivian police –acting as paid 
agents of the U.S.- detained Lujan, where he was barred from contacting the 
                                                 
103 Supra United States v. Toscanino  
104Id..  The court appears to have derived its authority to vitiate jurisdiction more from its supervisory Article 
III power, rather than from a jurisprudential understanding of Due Process.  See also: Supra United States v. 
Noriega (finding no source of supervisory authority under which the court could divest itself of jurisdiction 
because an act of war was necessary to effectuate defendant’s arrest). 
105 Id. 
106 Lujan v. Gengler, 2nd Cir., 510 F.2d 62 (1975) 
107 Id. 
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Argentinean embassy, a lawyer, or his family.108  During the time of his detention, 
he was neither formally charged by the Bolivian government nor did the United 
States formally request his extradition.  He remained in something of a legal black 
hole.  American agents and Bolivian police proceeded to place him on a plane, 
whereupon he was arrested by the United States upon arrival to the United 
States.109  According to the court, though Toscanino ensured that the government 
would not have carte blanche in the area of rendition, because no action by the 
government rose to the level of being a “deliberate, unnecessary, and 
unreasonable invasion of the accused’s Constitutional rights”110 the action did not 
violate his Due Process protections.  In the end, the court concluded, “not every 
irregularity in the circumstances of the defendant’s arrival in the jurisdiction 
would vitiate subsequent legal proceedings.”111  Taken together, Toscanino and 
Lujan essentially find that male captus bene detentus stands, except in those very 
rare instances of “serious violations of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th amendments.”112 
That same year the very same court again chose not to apply the “shock 
the conscience” exception.  Defendant Lira was charged out of the Southern 
District of New York for conspiracy to import narcotics.  While visiting the home 
of his common law wife in Santiago Chile, Lira was arrested by Chilean police 
allegedly acting on behalf of the United States, blindfolded, beaten, and tortured 
over a period of four weeks.113  Eventually he was placed onto a plane headed to 
New York, whereupon arrival he was promptly arrested by American 
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authorities.114  According to the court, this torture did not rise to the level of the 
Toscanino exception, most notably because the maltreatment took place largely 
without direct American involvement.115  This same refusal to apply the exception 
was held in both the First116 and Fifth117 Circuits in the following few years.  
Toscanino’s “shock the conscience” exemption was quickly eroding. 
But by 1990 the Seventh Circuit declared the Toscanino exception 
officially dead.118  Juan Ramon Matta-Bellesteros petitioned the Seventh Circuit 
for habeas corpus relief, alleging that when he arrived to his home in Honduras 
from work he was surprised to find Honduran Special Troops (“Cobras”) waiting 
for him, accompanied by at least four U.S. Marshals.119  He was handcuffed, 
hooded, and thrown onto the floor of a car driven by a U.S. Marshal, who 
proceeded to take him to a U.S. Air Force base an hour and a half away.120  
During the one and a half hour long drive he was apparently beaten and burned by 
stun guns at the direction of the U.S. Marshals.121  Once at the Air Force base, he 
was placed onto a plane headed to the U.S., whereupon he was again allegedly 
beaten and shocked all over his body by U.S. Marshals.122 Upon arrival to the 
United States, he was taken to prison and had to visit a doctor within twenty-four 
hours to care for severe abrasions and burns consistent with stun guns.123  The 
Seventh Circuit held that while it did not condone the activities of the U.S. 
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116 United States v. Cordero, 1st Cir., 42 F.3d 697 (1981) 
117 Supra United States v. Lopez 
118 Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 7th Cir., 896 F.2d 255 (1990) 
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Marshals, “Toscanino, at least as far as it creates an exclusionary rule, no longer 
retains vitality.”124 
With the Toscanino exception gasping for breath on its jurisprudential 
deathbed, the Supreme Court, for all intents and purposes, finished it off in United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain.  Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen, 
was indicted for participating in the torture and subsequent murder of a DEA 
agent in Mexico.  Specifically, he was accused of keeping the agent alive 
throughout prolonged periods of torture, in order to maximize the amount of 
information that could be elicited from the agent.125  DEA offered a Mexican 
official $50,000 plus expenses for delivering Alvarez-Machain to the United 
States.126  On April 2, 1990, five to six armed men burst into Alvarez-Machain’s 
office.127  One showed him a badge of the federal police, another placed a gun to 
his head and told him to cooperate or be killed.128  He was subsequently taken to a 
house in Guadalajara where he was forced to lie on the floor face down for two to 
three hours, while being shocked on soles of his shoes and twice injected with an 
unknown disoriented substance.129  He was then transported to Leon where he 
was met by an man who identified himself as a DEA agent and would take him to 
El Paso, Texas.130  Throughout the ordeal, DEA was heavily involved and those 
who participated in Mexico were generously compensation (some even relocated 
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to the United States at taxpayer’s expense).131  The Supreme Court again chose to 
assert Ker-Frisbie, saying that the conduct of the officers in abducting Alvarez-
Machain was immaterial to jurisdiction.132  
Once Alvarez-Machain faced trial, he was acquitted and filed suit against 
those involved in the abduction for a violation of the Foreign Tort Claims Act, to 
which the Supreme Court found a foreign civil immunity exception in favor of 
extraterritorial government action.133  By 1997, the Eleventh Circuit would go as 
far as to conclude that an act of war would not give rise to any authority allowing 
“a court to exercise its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment based on harm 
done by the government to third parties.”134 
 As a consequence of these cases, the general rule is this: Ker-Frisbee 
stands, Toscanino does not.  Despite public and international outcry against the 
practice, American courts have declared resoundingly that forcible abductions do 
not alone vitiate jurisdiction on Due Process grounds. 
 Courts abroad often recognize an entirely different standard for Due 
Process, or whatever the general equivalent may be.  Take, for instance, the 
rendition case of the ex-Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichman,135 where after having 
been abducted in Argentina by private Israeli citizens, and brought back for trial, 
the court concluded that had the action been conducted by agents of the Israeli 
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government, and not private citizens working in a private capacity,136 then the 
court would be required to vitiate jurisdiction.137  Likewise, were Argentina to 
contest jurisdictional grounds, which it had seized to do once the trial began,138 
then Israel may have been required to hand Eichman back over to the 
Argentineans.139  Unlike American judicial interpretation,140 the practice of 
vitiating jurisdiction on procedural objections has also persisted in British courts, 
among others.141  As a matter of American Constitutional law however, the law is 
settled; forcible abductions do not vitiate a court’s jurisdiction. 
 
V. International Legal Challenges 
American Constitutional and statutory provisions are not, of course, the 
sole sources of legal challenge to forcible abductions.  As international law would 
have it, the issue of legality revolves around threshold questions involving the 
degree of state responsibility in two concrete forms: sovereignty and human 
rights.  That is, the state is bound to respect not only the rights of other states, but 
the rights of persons as well.   
                                                 
136 Although it is widely agreed that the action was in fact a government sponsored forcible abduction, 
namely with the assistance and at the behest of the Israeli international intelligence and covert operations 
bureau, Mossad. 
137 Jones Q.C., Alun and Doobay, Anand, Jones and Doobay On Extradition and Mutual Assistance, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, England, 2005.  p.3-007 – 3-008 
138 Initially, Argentina did protest the Israeli action (see: 15 U.N.S.C.O.R., UN Doc S/4349), it seized its 
protest upon the initiation of criminal prosecution within Israel. 
139 Id.; In some instances, the issue of sovereignty is of less relevance because the government lacks effective 
control over the security of the state (see: Supra Ker v. Illinois) or because such territory is considered hostile 
territory in the midst of a declared war (see: Chandler v. United States, 1st Cir., 171 F.2d 921, cert. denied, 
336 U.S. 918 (1949), reli’g denied, 336 U.S.S 947 (1949)). 
140 Supra Alvarez-Machain 
141 Id. p. 3-009; Interestingly, initial practice of male captus bene detentus was largely predicated upon an 
early British case (Ex p. Scott 9 B&C 446 (1829)), although this trend was first reversed in British 
jurisprudence in 1982 (Ex p. Mackeson, 75 Cr. App. R. 24 (1982)).  See: Bantekas, Ilias and Susan Nash, 
International Criminal Law: 2nd Edition, Cavendish Publishing, London, United Kingdom, 2003. p. 218-219 
(discussing the origins of male captus bene detentus) and p.222-225 (discussing the “doctrine of abuse of 
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A. Sovereignty 
The most crucial, and no doubt most controversial, threshold question to 
be broached is that of sovereignty.  As general practice, those instances in which a 
given individual is forcibly rendered with the connivance of the host state pose no 
threat to sovereign rule.142  Non-consensual abduction, on the other hand, is far 
different.  Sources of state sovereignty, in the Westphalian world,143 are 
considered inherent and, with few exceptions,144 absolute.  But the definition and 
ultimate protection of that sovereignty comes principally from law, namely the 
United Nations Charter.  The Charter states that “all members shall refrain from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United 
Nations.”145  Successive international legal opinions have fortified the concept.  In 
1927 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in the Lotus case, struck 
down Turkey’s extraterritorial application of its domestic laws, namely because 
one state lacks the authority to exercise its power in the territory of another.146  
Following World War II, the ICJ went on to hold that one state cannot use force 
as remedy to the obstruction of passage in international waters.147 
                                                 
142 See, for example: Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 E. H. R. R. 19 (2003).  The case of R. v. Horseferry Road 
Magistrates’ Court, Ex Parte Bennett, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 42, [1993] 3 All E.R. 138, 3 W.L.R. 90, 98 Crim. 
App. 114.  House of Lords, June 24, 1993, may be an exception.  (See also: Wedgwood, Ruth, “Section Note: 
R. v. Horseferry Raod Magistrates’ Court, Ex Parte Bennett,” 89 A.J.I.L. 142, January, 1995).  
143 The October 24, 1648 Treaty of Westphalia established the end of the Thirty Years War in Europe and 
gave rise the modern conception of the sovereign and independent state.  Since that date, and largely up until 
the late 20th Century, the state was the primary actor with legal character in international relations and its 
derivative law. 
144 Exceptions may, for example, include the right of self-defense or various assertions on the grounds of Jus 
Cogens violations. 
145 United Nations Charter, Article II, Section 4 
146 France v. Turkey, P.C.I.J. No. 10 (1927) 
147 United Kingdom v. Albania (Corfu Case), I.C.J. 1 (1949) 
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Some have argued that forcible abductions are also likely to be considered 
uses of force.148  Most notable of exceptions to state sovereignty –particularly as it 
applies to the GWOT–includes Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which permits the 
use of force to repel149 “an armed attack.”150  In essence, this exception is 
consistent with self-defense theory, but is understood to require a showing of: (a) 
an identifiable threat, (b) an imminence in threat and (c) inability to solve the 
problem using less extreme measures.151 
 Identification of a precise threat can prove difficult when placed into the 
context of a geographically boundless conflict waged, to some extent, against an 
ideologically indeterminate enemy.152  Distinguishing between those which pose a 
direct threat to any one state however, is operationally difficult, perhaps 
impossible.  As a result, enormous latitude seems to be granted to Executive 
discretion (not limited to the United States) in assessing the degree to which any 
given individual, group, or organization threatens its security.  
                                                 
148 See: Weissman, Kristin Berdan “Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace,” 27 U.C. 
Davis L.Rev. 460, The Regents of the University of California, 1994 (arguing that forcible abductions are a 
form of “private reprisal” and therein considered an act of force). 
149 Some commentators assert that repelling an armed attack may come only after an armed attack has already 
taken place (see: Supra Weissman).  This interpretation of repulsion is entirely inconsistent with a growing 
acceptance toward preemptive action in the face of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.  
In any case, the attacks of 11 September 2001 would likely serve as sufficient showing of an “armed attack” 
in so far as activation of Article 51 within GWOT may be concerned. 
150 United Nations Charter Article 51 
151 Criteria of this sort is a matter of considerable debate within the international legal community, though 
perhaps the most widely cited standard is derived from the Caroline incident, where famed American 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster found that in order for preemptive measures to be taken, there must be “a 
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation.”  See Moore, John Norton, “The Use of Force in International Relations: Norms Concerning the 
Initiation of Coercion,” Chapter 4, in Supra Moore and Turner, p.69-206.  Perhaps the greatest impediment to 
developing a singular norm for the use of preemption is derived in the failure to first define the nature of 
aggression.  Aggression is unlawful  under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, and were an 
preemption deemed unlawful it would be considered so as a class of aggression.  But without an overarching 
definition for aggression, any precise definition of a class therein is necessarily incomplete. 
152 Though the present conflict has been dubbed the “Global War On Terrorism” most scholars would 
concede that the enemy can be more narrowly tailored to al-Qa’eda and its affiliate groups and/or 
movements.  Distinguishing between those which pose a direct threat to any one state however is 
operationally difficult, perhaps impossible.  As a result, enormous latitude seems to be granted to Executive 
discretion (not limited to the United States) in assessing the degree to which any given individual, group, or 
organization threatens the sovereign security of its state. 
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Perhaps the most troublesome of the requirements in modern days is that 
of imminence.  Preemption has long been conceived, American statesman Daniel 
Webster once famously penned, as requiring a “necessity of self-defense, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”153  It 
was under the banner of this authority for preemption which the State of Israel 
used in the initiation of the Six Day War and later in the bombing of an Iraqi 
nuclear facility.  
Modern interpretation of preemption –at least in so far as American policy 
reflects a change –altered radically upon the issuance of the National Security 
Strategy of the United States in 2002.154  In that report the President implied that 
the specter of threats which now exist both within a sub-state realm (namely from 
non-state actors like terrorists) and in a technological era of mass-casualty yields 
(namely from weapons of mass destruction), renders the Webster requirements 
obsolete.  The new paradigm is one of prevention rather than merely preemption; 
prevent terrorists’ future ability to strike rather than merely waiting for them to 
gain capacities to do so.  Such reinterpretation compels the question of whether 
the GWOT exists within a climate where overt Executive action is deemed 
universally permissible in pursuit of self-defense.  Any answer to that question is, 
to date, necessarily incomplete, limited to the interpretation of the interested 
party.  Until an “uninterested,” supranational body with recognized authority 
within the state system, like the United Nations Security Council or International 
                                                 
153 Moore, John Norton and Turner, Robert F., National Security Law, 2nd Edition, Carolina Academic Press, 
Durham, North Carolina, 2005.  p.521 
154 The doctrine of preemption has been subsequently upheld by the National Security Strategy of the United 
States in 2006. 
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Court of Justice, takes it upon itself to redefine the aegis of permissible self-
defense (or reassert the old paradigm), the interpretation and application of the 
self-defense requirement will likely be specific to the nature of the action and 
involved actors, or will be again delegated to the province of bilateral, or 
selectively multilateral, agreement. 
Ultimately however, this reinterpretation of permissible threat 
neutralization has little applicability to the narrow instances of forcible abductions 
for criminal prosecution.  Though, there can be little doubt, that the arrest and 
prosecution of alleged terrorists is itself a form of threat neutralization, because 
such action can take place only pursuant to federal criminal indictment, and 
because criminal prosecutions are themselves reactive rather than proactive, some 
injury against the state must be believed to have taken place.  Whereas the 
instrument of ‘targeted killing’155 may in certain cases be directed against 
perceived threats who, up to the point of execution, might never have committed 
an offense against the United States, alleged criminals are, by definition, believed 
to have committed an affirmative act against the state.  This is not to suggest, of 
course, that such criminal conduct itself rises to an act against the state sufficient 
to trigger the right of self-defense, some of those rendered may be sought for 
white collar fraud offenses, for instance.  But in so far as a link may be drawn 
between these alleged acts and terrorist activity, the rendition would still qualify 
under the pre 11 September doctrine of self-defense.156 
                                                 
155 For more on the legality of “targeted killing” see: Banks, William C.  and Peter Raven-Hansen, “Targeted 
Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework,” University of Richmond Law Review, 37 U. Rich. L. 
R. 667 (2003). 
156 The rendering of individuals for activities other than those which might be linked to terrorism fall beyond 
the scope of this note, though the forcible abduction of a given individual for autonomous crimes which 
 
34 
Taken collectively then, whether the interpretation of sovereignty is 
restrictive or expansive forcible abduction executed by the seeking state without 
the knowledge of the host state is impermissible unless qualified by a robust 
interpretation of self-defense.157 
 Further, the Tokyo (1969), Montreal (1971), Hague (1971), and Hostage 
Conventions (1979) oblige contracting states to extradite or to prosecute alleged 
criminals (aut dedere aut judicare, extradite or prosecute),158 particularly within 
the sphere of terrorism.159  The United Nations Security Council has even gone so 
far as to impose economic sanctions where a state failed to extradite or prosecute 
alleged terrorists.160  In those instances where a state fails in its obligation to 
appropriately address terrorists, and where another state maintains under the 
banner of its protective principle the right to prosecute, exercising that right may 
require infringement upon the sovereignty of another state.  Failure of the host 
                                                                                                                                     
would not be understood to trigger the right of self-defense would likely be outside of the self-defense 
exception and prove wholly irreconcilable with the supreme right of the state to be sovereign. 
157 What recourse for a violation of this principle, particularly when the action is law enforcement and not 
military in nature, is unclear.  If military in nature, it is conceivable that a state may make claims of 
aggression, but positive action for recourse is unlikely in so far as the United States holds a veto in the United 
Nations Security Council, the only supranational body which maintains lawful authority to bring such 
recourse. 
158 Laflin, Melanie M., “Kidnapping Terrorists: Bringing International Criminals to Justice through Irregular 
Rendition and Other Quasi-Legal Options,” Journal of Legislation, 26 J. Legis. 315, p.2-3; Convention on 
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, December 4, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2941 (1969); 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1646 art. 7 
(1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, September 
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 575 art. 7; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, December 4, 
1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1460 art. 8.  See also European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, opened for 
signature January 27, 1977, 15 I.L.M. 1272-76 (1976) (providing members to the Council of Europe a similar 
requirement); United States Draft Convention For the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of 
International Terrorism, October 16, 1972, 678 Dep’t State Bull (1972) as published in John Norton Moore, 
et al, National Security Law Documents, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1995. p.319-
322; Supra Bantekas p. 160-161 (citing as the first multilateral treaty encouraging prosecution of non-
extradited alleged criminals as the 1929 Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, 112 
LNTS 371);  Nulyarimma v. Thompson (Australian Federal Court, 1999), FCA 1192 (finding that aut dedere 
aut judicare is found within customary international law). 
159 This dictum is granted greater significance in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 
S/RES/1373(2001) (mandating all member States take immediate action to criminalize terrorism related 
activity). 
160 U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (imposing economic sanction against Libya for failing to extradite two 
nationals accused ob bombing Pan Am flight 103 in 1988). 
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state under its treaty obligations to address terrorism does not vitiate the 
imperative of the seeking state to see to it that justice be met.  Indeed, it may be 
said, the failure of the host state to meet its obligations may go far in reducing its 
claim in providing sovereign immunity to terrorists.161 
 
B.  Human Rights 
 In addition to the issue of sovereignty, as noted before, another possible 
objection from the sphere of international law is one of human rights.162  Human 
rights law, with respect to its applicability to forcible abductions, has its birth 
principally in the United Nations Charter and the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCRP). 
 
  1. United Nations Charter 
 Article 55, section c of the Charter requires that states promote “universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”163  It goes on to state 
that “all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55.”164  When these two treaty-based requirements are coupled with an 
ICJ decision declaring that “a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant 
                                                 
161 Others may assert that a similar imperative may exist were terrorism understood within the scope of the 
universality principle rather than within the scope of the protective principle.  Although distinguishing the 
two is not of concern here, particularly where the claim to universality appear weak, although it would seem a 
dangerous incursion to the system of autonomous, sovereign states were the principle of universality 
sufficient to waive sovereignty claims in the face of extraterritorial forcible abductions.   
162 International Humanitarian Law (or the Laws of War) are not applicable within the context of law 
enforcement activities, even though such actions are conducted during wartime. 
163 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 3 
164 Id. 
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violation of the purposes and principles of the charter,”165 a clear requirement 
may be gleaned: states must observe human rights.  What those rights consist in, 
however, is not so clear. The primary document in international law enumerating 
the most fundamental of individual rights is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  In the declaration, individuals are promised rights to life, liberty, and 
security of person166 and the right against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.167  
These rights largely mirror those found within the American Due Process clause, 
and are likely to be interpreted as providing prohibitions on those forcible 
abductions of alleged terrorists where conducting similar actions within the 
United States would vitiate one’s Due Process rights.168   The natural question 
becomes whether or not the Declaration is binding under international law.   
Upon creation, the Declaration was not, in the words of the ICJ, “in the 
nature of a treaty binding on the states.”169  Some argue, however, that over the 
past fifty-seven years of its existence, the provisions have become part of the 
“general principles of international law” and should be considered an official 
interpretation of Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.  The sole question, for scholars in 
that vein at least, is to whether abductions constitute violations of the Declaration.  
No American court, has recognized, or even addressed the issue, but eminent 
Professor Jordan Paust has written that the practice:  
                                                 
165 Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971. 
166 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 3 
167 UDHR Article 9 
168 Note that this prohibition is especially weak.  Under Ker v.Illinois, the act of forcible abductions within 
the domestic sphere are understood not to vitiate jurisdiction on Due Process grounds, the only question is 
whether a court –American, international, or foreign –would apply this principle neatly to the international 
legal sphere as well.  It is thus likely wholly dependent upon what court the case is brought before.  After all, 
because such actions are for prosecutorial purposes, likely pursuant to indictment, there exists no human right 
against criminal prosecution and the extraterritorial arrest therewith. 
169  
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may not be incompatible with principles of justice, 
‘unjust’, ‘unlawful’, or otherwise ‘arbitrary’ to abduct or 
capture an international criminal in a context where 
action is reasonably necessary, to assure adequate 
sanction against egregious international criminal 
activity.170  
 
This would likely only enhance when dealing in the realm of national 
security.  Indeed, he later rightfully notes that an abduction may even prove to be 
a less violent method of threat neutralization, and perhaps more proportionate as 
the laws of war require.171  In this regard, abduction satisfies not only the 
requirements under the charter, but also the later discussed prima facie dictum 
that obliges all states to use the most restrictive means to effectuate desired ends. 
  
  2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
(ICCPR) 
An individual’s second source of internationally recognized human rights 
is found amidst a motley collection of multilateral conventions of which the 
United States is a party.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), for example, expands upon the United Nations Charter and the 
Declaration by establishing not only the shared right against arbitrary arrest and 
detention,172 but also asserts an international right of Due Process,173 freedom of 
movement,174 and right against being expelled from one’s country in any manner 
other than the procedures established by law (except in national security 
                                                 
170 Paust, Bassiouni, Scharf, Gurule, Sadat, Zagaris, Williams, eds., International Criminal Law: Cases and 
Materials, 2nd Edition, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina.  2000. 
171 Id. 
172 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
6I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
173 Id. 
174Id. Art. 12 
 
38 
instances).175  Perhaps most important relative to forcible abductions though, are 
three protection provided for within ICCPR’s Article 9. Article (9)1 sates that “no 
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law,”176 and Article 9(5) goes on to say 
that “anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation.”177  Again, the question is raised as to whether 
the activity of law enforcement is covered within the specter of general law 
enforcement authority or under the threat neutralization mechanism offered by the 
post-11 September AUMF.  Because law enforcement is bound by its own 
provisions, provisions which under American legal interpretation are not vitiated 
upon the presence of the “mere irregularity” of forcible abduction, it is unlikely 
that any American court would find provisions within the ICCPR to prohibit such 
activity. 
 
C. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
It is long-established practice178 that, as a member of the United Nations, 
the United States is bound by the edicts of the Security Council.179   With respect 
                                                 
175 Id. Art.13 
176Id. Art. 9(1) 
177 Id. Art. 9(5) 
178 Cornell, Michael L., “A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of United Nations Actions in the 
Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 16 Conn. J. Int’l L. 325, Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, Spring 2005. 
179 See also: Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 54 (June 21, 1971) stating in 
part: “Security Council resolutions are binding on member states that must carry out the resolution;” Michael 
P. Scharf, “The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium: Lessons From the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal,” 49 DePaul L. Rev. 925, DePaul Law Review, Summer 2000, stating in part: “Under 
international law, a State has a duty to comply with its international legal obligations, including binding 
Chapter VII Security Council Resolutions, which take precedence over all domestic legal obligations.  A 
State may not legitimately assert that it is unable to fulfill its international legal obligations on the basis that it 
is prohibited from doing so by domestic legislation, or that it lacks the necessary domestic authority.” 
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to the international legal sphere, if not applicable to domestic legal application, 
these edicts trump domestic law.180  It follows then, that the application of a 
Security Council resolution prohibiting forcible abductions which take place 
without the consent of the host state would apply equally to the United States as it 
did to the party to which it was initially directed.  Responding to Israel’s forcible 
abduction of Adolf Eichman in Argentina, the Security Council in 1960 
denounced the move as contrary to standards of international law and a material 
breach in Argentina’s sovereign territory.181  It remains unclear, albeit unlikely 
however, that a past Security Council resolution condemning one forcible 
abduction could be read to bind the United States from taking similar future 
action with respect to the ongoing GWOT.  But one Security Council action does 
come squarely into play.  Following the initiation of hostilities by the al-Qa’eda 
network on 11 September 2001, the United Nations took prompt action in passing 
Security Council Resolution 1373.182  UNSCR 1373, mandates that all states must 
criminalize terrorist related activity, end material support or safe-haven to 
international terrorists, and take necessary measures to end the financing regimes 
therein, and constructed a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to oversee 
implementation of such provisions.183  In a ministerial annex to UNSCR 1456 
(2003), the Security Council addressed the issue of human rights applicability to 
counterterrorism measures, saying, in part that  
                                                 
180 Id.; See also: U.N. Charter art. 25; Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1115 
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 27; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, S. Exec. Doc. No. 92-1, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1974). 
181 U.N.S.C.R.. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) 
182 Supra S/RES/1373(2001) 
183 Id.; The UN Counter-Terrorism Community was further bolstered by the addition of a Counter-Terrorism 
Executive Directorate (CTED), under S/RES/1535(2004). 
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States must ensure that any measure[s] taken to 
combat terrorism comply with all their obligations 
under international law, and should adopt such 
measures in accordance with international law, in 
particular international human rights, refugee, and 
humanitarian law.184 
 
The Security Council in 2005 proceeded to pass UNSCR 1624, stressing that 
counterterrorism measures by member states must “comply with all of their 
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, 
refugee law, and humanitarian law.”185  Where the rights provided criminal 
defendants, among others, within the Declaration and ICCPR may not be binding 
upon the President as such, the dictates of the Security Council have been so 
viewed. Again, however, because such activities are of a law enforcement nature, 
conducted consistent with American interpretations of lawful law enforcement 
activity, as evidenced by the avalanche of those cases upholding the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine generally, it is unlikely that any American court would read post-11 
September 2001 UNSCR actions as prohibiting forcible abductions when aimed at 
criminal prosecution. 
 
C. Customary International Law 
For a given practice to fall under the scope of custom, it “must be a 
widely-recognized practice of nations that states follow out of a sense of legal 
obligation.”186  The Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain, expressed doubt that 
                                                 
184 S/RES/1456(2003), Annex (6). 
185 S/RES/1624(2005)  
186 Trudy, Timothy, “Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbee?” St. Mary’s Law Journal, 26 St. Mary’s L. J. 791, 
1995, p.3. 
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such custom exists.187  Ultimately however, a state is not obliged to act consistent 
with a custom if that state consistently rejects the practice.188  Because, as 
discussed previously, the American Executive branch has consistently practiced 
and the American judiciary in turn has consistently upheld, forcible abductions 
since 1896,189 little doubt remains that an exception to any possible custom 
against the practice has been carved.  However, additional customary practice 
must also be considered.   
The first prima facie challenge posed by international law to forcible 
abductions comes in the form of the Latin axiom nunquam decurritur ad 
extraordinarium sed utoi deficit ordinarium –never resort to the extraordinary 
until the ordinary fails.190  As a well established principle of international law, this 
rule of the extraordinary, as it might be called, would permit the Ker-Frisbee 
Doctrine only after all alternatives had been exhausted.  The watershed case for 
this rule came in 1959 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which 
established that where rights claimed by one state have been breached by another 
in violation of international law,191 all local remedies must first be exhausted 
before resorting to the ICJ.192  This general exhaustive rule has been subsequently 
interpreted to mean that states should not take extreme measures when non-
                                                 
187 Supra Alvarez-Machain.  See also: Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90, 98 (Cass. Crim. 1964) (France) (denying 
prosecutorial immunity to defendant abducted from Germany); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 
I.L.R. 5, 6567 (Dist. Ct. 1961) (Israel) (basing personal jurisdiction over abducted defendant in United States 
case law) aff’d, 36 I.L.R. 277, 342 (S. Ct. 1962); Martin Feinrider, “Extraterritorial Abductions: A Newly 
Developing International Standard,” 14 Akron L. Rev. 27, 28 (1980) (asserting that foreign courts generally 
uphold detentions resulting from improper captures).  All citations here have been adapted from: Supra Trudy 
p.18. 
188 Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 27778, November 200l, 
189 Supra Ker v. Frisbee 
190 Supra Bassiouni 
191 Supra Paust 
192 Switzerland v. United States of America  (1959) 
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extreme measures are available.193  Ramzi Yousef, if this principle were to hold, 
should not have been abducted by the United States, in light of the fact that other 
alternatives were available.194 
A second procedural pram facie challenge to abductions in international 
law is best expressed by another Latin axiom, Ex Injuria Ius Non Oritur.195  As 
the Roman counterpart to the American exclusionary rule, “it requires that certain 
violations of law not ripen into lawful results.”196  One who commits an injuria 
must redress it apart from its result, and no lawful benefits may be accrued by the 
violator for his acts.197  Under the rubric of forcible abductions then, this 
international norm would suggest that because an abduction is itself unlawful, 
particularly when conducted without the consent of the host state, the court would 
be required to vitiate its jurisdiction.  This principle however, like the one 
preceding it, is just that: a principle, not a law.  As a norm of international 
conduct it too is not binding, and thus cannot flatly prohibit the action. 
Even if such customs were persuasive however, they remain merely 
general principles of law.  Customary international law, according to Supreme 
Court interpretation, encourages the Executive towards or against particular 
actions, particularly in the absence of Congressional direction.  But, as many 
American legal scholars have noted, international custom is not strictly binding in 
                                                 
193 Supra Paust 
194 Traditional procedures of extradition may have been pursued, in addition to prosecution predicated upon 
likely criminal exposure within the host state of Pakistan. 
195 Supra Bassiouni 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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the same sense as might a treaty bind the Executive.198  Under this practical, albeit 
no less dismissive, interpretation then, forcible abductions may be impermissible 
within the purview of international law, though not directly binding upon the 
President. 
 
VI. Dodging the Treaty 
 As a general rule of practice, most foreign courts recognize the extradition 
treaty as being the sole source of authorized rendition.199  Consequently, if the 
treaty permits only extradition by way of a formal process, all forms of irregular 
rendition are necessarily excluded and thus impermissible.  Much to the 
successive consternation of American allies in the providing of mutual legal 
assistance, American courts have routinely ruled contrary to this general 
international norm.  According to American case law, the scope of a given 
extradition treaty is conceived as merely outlining a method for rendition, not the 
method, which leaves alternative, extraordinary, or irregular methods available, in 
so far as the extradition treaty fails to explicitly prohibit them.200 
                                                 
198 This interpretation of Executive authority is widely disputed, particularly when the noted customs of 
international law find a nexus with Federal common law.  (See generally: Dycus, Berney, Banks, Raven-
Hansen, ed, National Security Law, 3rd Edition, Aspen Publishers, New York, New York, 2002. P. 236-241).  
The conflict most vividly arises from conflicting interpretation of two cases: The Paquete Habana (175 U.S. 
677, S. Ct. 1900) and Mir v. Meese, 11th Cir.., 788 F.2d 1446 (1986).  In Paquete, the court held that, 
“International Law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of 
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”  Mir went on to 
distinguish this framework by deciding that a decision by the Attorney General to detain illegal aliens from 
Cuba for an extended period of time constituted a “controlling executive act” within the Paquete definition, 
and thus was not overruled by international legal norms which prohibited such action.  In any event, the 
judicial trend seems to be towards a general deferral to Executive decision, rather than to the norms or of 
international law. 
199 Supra Jones and Doobay p.79-102 
200 This interpretation is most saliently made by the Court’s opinion in supra United States v. Alvarez-
Machain. 
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 Among the first watershed cases in the modern avoidance of extradition 
treaties was decided in 1980 by the 9th Circuit, United States v. Valot.201  Steven 
Valot violated parole in the District of Hawaii by traveling to Asia and then to 
Nevada.202  A warrant was issued for his arrest.  In 1977 he was arrested and 
incarcerated in Thailand for marijuana related charges.203  On May 4, 1979, Thai 
officials brought Valot to the Bangkok airport and forced him to remain there 
until American DEA agents arrived, who then forcibly took him board a flight 
back to Honolulu.204  Valot contended that that his removal was in violation of the 
extradition treaty and prosecution was therefore barred.  The court held that where 
no formal extradition request exists and the defendant is deported by the 
authorities of another country, and no “extradition” formally occurs, failure to 
carry out the requirements of the extradition treaty does not bar prosecution.205 
The Supreme Court went on to uphold this principle twelve years later, in 
the much-discussed Alvarez-Machain case.206  On April 18, 1990, the Mexican 
embassy officially requested information from the Department of State on the 
details of the case, threatening that bilateral relations would be endangered if the 
allegations were true.  Then, on May 16, 1990, the Mexican embassy again wrote 
to the State Department, this time contending that the abduction and detention of 
Alvarez-Machain was in violation of the extradition treaty.  Only July 19, 1990, 
the embassy presented a third communiqué to State, this time requesting the arrest 
and extradition of any informants and the DEA agent who masterminded the 
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206 Supra United States v. Alvarez-Machain; See discussion above. 
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Alvarez-Machain abduction.  Alvarez-Machain himself moved to dismiss the 
indictment, calling the government conduct outrageous.207   
Although the controversial legacy of the American evasion of treaty law 
still remains, it stands among considerable dissent both inside and outside the 
courtroom.  Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and O’Connor dissented vehemently in 
the Alvarez-Machain case, contending “that the Executive may wish to reinterpret 
the Treaty to allow for an action that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not 
influence this Court’s interpretation.”208  When these actions are taken “without 
consent of the foreign government,” the dissenters quote the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations, “abducting a person from a foreign 
country is a gross violation of international law and… is a blatant violation of the 
territorial integrity of another state” and “eviscerates the extradition system.”209 
  
VII. Political Ramifications 
Taking action which is not only inconsistent with the judicial 
interpretations of courts around the world, but also a flagrant –if necessary –
incursion of sovereignty undermines a state’s political reliability in the view of 
other states, roundly jeopardizing the integrity of mutual legal assistance and 
extradition treaties collectively.  After the abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, for example, Canada and Mexico, among a number of other states, 
                                                 
207 Information for this paragraph comes in part from case material and in part from Paust, Bassiouni, Scharf, 
Gurule, Sadat, Zagaris, Williams, eds., International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd Edition, 
Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina.  2000. 
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protested the apparent circumvention of treaty-law.210  Some even submitted 
amicus curiae briefs to that affect.211  Similar reactions occurred in response to 
the Israeli abduction of Eichman.212  American use of extraterritorial non-
consensual arrest alienates even its closest friends and allies by actively drawing 
into question the validity of its agreements.213 
International law is a precarious beast in that it mostly lacks enforcement 
mechanisms.  It is, instead, formalized agreements based upon good faith, a faith 
which a nation willingly undermines by permitting or conducting abductions.  
American use of forcible abductions, as with all forms of rendition which actively 
ignore the presence of a treaty, may be viewed by some states as something 
ultimately more cancerous than an aberration from good faith procedures of 
rendition.  It is, many states might contend, endemic to the stylistic modus 
operandi of American exceptionalism; an exceptionalism which must not be 
permitted to remain untouched.  Of course, the degree to which any activity 
involves the connivance of the host state respectively alters the severity of this 
view.  In those cases which involve a private citizen of any variety working in an 
exclusively private capacity, the international norm would seem to lean towards 
the Israeli court’s view in Eichman that jurisdiction exists only in so far as the 
host state refuses to contest.  Should the state contest jurisdiction, the individual 
would perforce be returned with apology. 
                                                 
210 Supra Alvarez-Machain. 
211 Id. 
212 U.N.S.C.R.. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) 
213 Platt, Ian J., “International Law- All Nations Beware: United States Extradition Treaty with Mexico Does 
Not Prohibit Forcible Abductions- United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992),” Suffolk 
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Members of the American law enforcement community can be reassured 
however, that for the present most states within the GWOT regime –if it could be 
so called –would likely tolerate this exceptionalism.  If a member of the al-Qa’eda 
terrorist network were identified in Europe, it seems reasonable in this milieu to 
believe that European authorities would be disinclined to protest the alleged 
terrorist’s forcible abduction, particularly if he/she did not hold European 
citizenship or was considered a high-value target and a danger to the 
community.214  Indeed, most states would likely be inclined towards offering 
material assistance in the effort, again provided the individual either is not a 
citizen of that state or is deemed a serious danger to the community.   
As with most things in a time of war, the latitude granted to state conduct 
expands immensely, but when the latitude permits exceptionalism to a perceived 
law –as many in the international community perceive the exclusivity of the 
extradition treaty –those exceptions weave their way into the fabric of the whole.  
Jurisprudence of whatever color has a baseline in precedent.  By permitting the 
United States to continue its practice of ignoring the international norm, states 
seem to be drawing a line of permissibility around American actions in times of 
the extreme, thereby giving a card for American law enforcement officials to 
draw from the deck in the future.  It could become, one might presume, an 
important precedent for the permissibility of such action.   
How can states stop America from conducting forcible abductions should 
it deem it necessary?  The answer is manifold, but among the tools are two 
                                                 
214 To further bolster this assertion, it would seem that some European states, as will be discussed in 
Monograph 5 of this note, have been willing not to protest covert operations for third party interrogative 
renditions, an altogether far more precarious act. 
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general postures.  First is the legal response.  Members of the international 
community could very well undercut the root of the American judicial 
interpretation that a treaty is a method of rendition, rather than the method, by 
renegotiating their treaties of extradition.  When an extradition treaty includes a 
compass provision of exclusivity, that is where it states that all other forms of 
rendition not mentioned are expressly forbidden, the loophole through which 
American law enforcement officials have been jumping since Frisbie would at 
last be ended. 
The second posture is largely political.  Because renegotiation of 
extradition treaties with the United States may prove infeasible or politically 
remiss, a state could seek an executive agreement215 in some form that no 
individual would be forcibly abducted from either state without express 
permission (connivance) of the host state.  By making such an agreement a state 
would allow American exceptionalism in times of crisis, but would likewise hold 
a firm contractual agreement with which the unwitting host state would hold even 
stronger quasi-legal grounds for dissent, thereby maintaining additional leverage 
against the seeking, or in this case aggressor, state.  Whether this executive 
agreement could also be used to undercut the Ker-Frisbee avoidance of the treaty 
is unclear, but it certainly would provide a significant rostrum in international 
relations. 
 American exceptionalism is not to be a concern addressed by foreign 
states alone.  Because all political relations exist within some version of game 
                                                 
215 The does have the authority to enter into executive agreements without the express consent of Congress, 
see: United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
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theory, in which a given political actor must take into account assessments of 
probability in what other actors may do, coupled with the intrinsic quid-pro-quo 
of normal political relations, the United States, however strong, must always be 
concerned with how it is perceived.  Indeed, given the fragile nature of 
international law and its derivative political relations, it would be folly to believe 
that the inherent degradation to treaty law which comes as byproduct of forcible 
abductions does nothing against the credibility of American word.  How can a 
nation so dependent upon its neighbors, particularly as the world becomes smaller 
and the state-system becomes weaker, face them in earnest when it overtly dodges 
agreements?  The Executive branch must recognize that proud assertion of 
American right, even when it concerns a nation’s most treasured necessity of 
security, may lead to an undesirable corrosion of its credibility.  The 
neutralization of combatants is a priority of supreme importance during the 
GWOT, as in any wartime footing, but there is a right way and a wrong way for 
one to execute that war.  Minimizing damage to the political, ethical, and legal 
institutions in the process of conducting operations is a vital interest to 
maintaining vitality in the infrastructure of that which is called America.  This is 
not to suggest that forcible abductions are a modern innovation in the law or in 
law enforcement instruments, but their prolonged supply in time compounded by 
their more recent demand in frequency brings new light to their use as a method 
of American policing. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
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It appears that few courts, if any, would today be willing to recognize 
abductions as a violation of Due Process, or any other Constitutional right, or 
even any non-Constitutional right gleaned from or proscribed by treaty.  Even the 
nature of the treatment by agents seems unlikely to affect the jurisdiction of the 
court –as the Toscanino exception slowly slips into legal irrelevance.  The 
permissibility of abductions, whether by way of overt seizure or 3rd party 
connivance, becomes all the more strengthened when the subject matter, identity 
of the defendant, or nature of the crime reaches a nexus with national security 
interests, leaving any suspected terrorist virtually stripped of anything that might 
seem on first impression to be a right of free movement, or the ability to find 
refuge beneath the inveterate international edifice of state sovereignty.  In the 
final analysis then, abductions for the purpose of obtaining possession over the 
body of a suspected criminal is decidedly lawful- particularly when used as a last 
resort –if ethically hazardous and politically unsound.  
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Kidnapping Terrorists: Extraterritorial Forcible Abductions in the Global War on Terrorism - Monograph 2 
Third-Party Interrogative Renditions  
 
The following is the second and last monograph of a two part series 
on the use of extraterritorial forcible abductions in the Global War 
On Terrorism (GWOT).  This monograph discusses the use of these 
as the product of covert intelligence or military operations for the 
purposes of detention or third-party interrogative renditions.216 
 
I. Introduction 
 Despite successive waves of public expressions to the contrary, the 
entirety of the national security legal field did not completely revolutionize when 
nineteen al-Qa’eda affiliated hijackers turned four American airliners into 
weapons in the Fall of 2001.  But this reality has done little to assuage some 
critics over the use of certain tactics to execute the newly realized war on any and 
all associated with those terrorists and their organization, the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) as it has come to be known.  Forcible abductions may 
themselves be one matter of contention, but when those abductions take place as a 
matter of American covert operation policy executed by the particularly 
clandestine Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and then used not for prosecution 
but instead to bring about isolated detentions in undisclosed locations for 
potentially indefinite periods of time, the validity of such activities is drawn 
seriously into question.  It is a point of pivot from the use of extraterritorial 
forcible abductions for prosecutorial purposes into the venue of clandestine 
intelligence sources and methods emblematic of the larger paradigm shift away 
from criminal prosecution found within the field of modern American 
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antiterrorism.  The ends, rather than the means, have changed.  And from this 
change in ends, the practice of third-party interrogative renditions emerged; 
extraterritorial forcible abductions by one state within the territory of a second 
state with the aim of interrogation in a third altogether.  Radical as the shift may 
be, what makes it of particular concern is the apparent frequency in its use.  
Initially meant to be used in extraordinary cases, hence the public terminology 
“extraordinary rendition,” public revelations over apparent instances alone 
indicate that it may be considered closer to ordinary.  Like most instruments of 
counterterrorism, this one is not new to the post-September 11th milieu,217 though 
heightened awareness and the influx of such activities thrusts it into the limelight 
of public discontent.  Initiated by President Clinton, President Bush has reportedly 
maintained the covert action program and expanded its use by magnificent 
proportions.  According to one report, “well over 100 people have disappeared”218 
since the commencement of the covert operation program.  Another report has the 
number at upwards of some 150 individuals since September 11th alone.219 
Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the 9/11 
Commission that the United States was involved in over 80 renditions prior to 
9/11.220  CBS News’ 60 Minutes was able to track down some 600 flights to 40 
different countries, a veritable “who’s who” of the State Department’s listed 
                                                 
217 As discussed in section 3 of this monograph, authorization for third-party interrogative renditions came 
well before 11 September 2001. 
218 60 Minutes, “CIA Flying Suspects to Torture?” CBS News, March 6, 2005. 
219 Mayer, Jane, “Outsourcing Torture,” The New Yorker, February 14, 2005. 
220 Tenet, George, “Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States,” March 24, 2004.   
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human rights abusers, onboard a fleet221 some writers have referred to collectively 
as Torture Air.222 While the program was initially intended as an extreme last 
resort for high-value targets, the post- 9/11 environment has engendered an air of 
permissibility around the process, particularly in light of the newly recognize 
combatant –rather than criminal –status for terrorists.  With such status, members 
of the intelligence and military communities are left with a choice: either send the 
suspect to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or another military or CIA-run camp,223 or 
ship him off to another country altogether.  Indeed, as one commentator has 
noted, “in criminal justice, you either prosecute the suspects or let them go.  But if 
you’ve treated them in ways that won’t allow you to prosecute them you’re in this 
no man’s land.  What do you do with these people?”224 
 Why not interrogate the suspects ourselves?  Explanations have been 
sparse, though in most instances it would seem that any lawful action that might 
be taken by a foreign intelligence service might as well be conducted by the 
American government, unless of course those foreign intelligence services are 
presumed to use tactics that are unlawful under American law.225  But that 
something should not be done does not by extension make it unlawful.  And so it 
                                                 
221This fleet appears to be principally owned and operated by private companies who contract their planes out 
to the CIA’s Special Collection Service, see: St. Clair, Jeffrey, “Torture Air, Incorporated: The Road to 
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detainee, as it relates to the building of a rapport.  But in the known instances of rendition, in addition to 
recorded human rights records of those countries to which detainees are rendered, tactics utilized by these 
foreign intelligence services appear to focus more on the forcing of a confession through coercive measures, 
rather than through the process of interview aimed at gleaning full and truthful information.  Under these 
conditions, it would seem, nationality may be of little consequence. 
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is in the vein of profound remorse that such notes must be written to give due 
consideration to the legitimacy of the Executive's legal claim. 
One fundamental difficulty in assessing what constitutes a third-party 
interrogative rendition comes about within the province of delineating fine line 
distinctions between whether a given suspect was rendered for the purposes of 
interrogation or, in light of the fact that many of these individuals are sought for 
various crimes in those countries to which we are rendering them, whether such 
renditions are instead for the purposes of prosecution.  For those countries to 
which many of the suspects have allegedly been sent, there may be no distinction.  
Tough interrogation is, it would seem, an inherent instrument of typical Islamist 
prosecutions and/or detentions in many of those states.226  Thus, a nexus is 
reached between American interests to obtain information, and the interrogating 
state’s interest to detain.  Covert interrogative renditions then, are seen by many 
in the field as a move to bridge the gap, a Pareto Improvement227 to performance 
in the GWOT.  
 
II. Constitutional Framework 
Presidential authority relative to the execution of these renditions crosses 
the spectrum of his Constitutionally bequeathed powers.  As the Chief Executive, 
he is bound to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress, as Commander-in-
                                                 
226 Amnesty International, “Torture and Secret Detention: Testimony of the ‘Disappeared’ in the ‘War on 
Terror,’” AMR 51/108/2005, August 4, 2005; Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: 
Human Rights Abuses Worldwide,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Ppaer for the 59th Session of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, March 25, 2003. 
227 A “Pareto Improvement” refers to the economic phenomenon whereby any given action makes at least 
one party better off without making another party worse off.  In some instances, the given action may make 
both parties better off.  Lieberman, Marc and Robert Hall, Introduction to Economics, 2nd Edition, Thomson 
SouthWestern Press, 2005. 
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Chief he is obliged to provide for the executive functions relating to the national 
security, and as chief foreign relations negotiator he is authorized to conduct and 
execute the details of American foreign policy.  Within each distinct authority, in 
addition to a customary extraconstitutional gloss of Presidential practice, 
Presidential claims relative to the third-party interrogative renditions may be 
made. 
 
A. Chief Executive Authority and Third-Party Interrogative 
Renditions 
 
1.  The Framework of Covert Action 
From that which has been reported to date, third-party interrogative 
renditions have taken place as covert operations, rather than as extensions of law 
enforcement or military authority.228  Covert action generally “involves activities 
designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in 
support of U.S. foreign policy in such a way that the involvement of the U.S. is 
not apparent.”229  This may include anything from the development and dispersal 
of propaganda230 to espionage.  Covert operations, on the other hand, are that 
form of covert action which typically involve a paramilitary operation.231  
Authority for these clandestine activities is broadly gleaned from the Director of 
Central Intelligence’s mandate codified in the National Security Act of 1947, 
                                                 
228 Although the military and/or law enforcement officials, it appears, may have been involved in some of the 
operations, provided actionable intelligence, or otherwise accepted the suspects for detention following the 
rendition, the primary actors seem to be officers with the CIA.  Consequently, the laws of covert action are 
those most applicable restrictions. 
229 Richelson, Jeffrey T., The U.S. Intelligence Community, Fourth Edition, Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1999. p.349 
230 See generally The Word War;  Shulsky, Abram N. and Schmitt, Gary J., Silent Warfare: Understanding 
the World of Intelligence, Third Edition, Brassey’s Inc., Dulles, Virginia, 2002. p.84-86 
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essentially granting him authority to direct five functions: (a) collect foreign 
intelligence, (b) provide effective overall direction for the intelligence 
community, (c) correlate and synthesize intelligence, (d) perform other function 
he determines would enhance efficiency, and (e) “perform such other functions 
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or 
the National Security Council may direct.”232  This fifth-function has been, 
despite original intent to the contrary,233 interpreted to offer statutory authority for 
the execution of covert action of all stripes.234  Though the Agency is understood 
to hold the power to conduct covert operations under this authority, other laws 
have narrowed the scope of what can be done and provide formal processes by 
which the programs may be approved. 
Congressional restrictions regarding oversight have become pervasive 
since the 1974 enactment of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.235  According to this 
amendment, in order for the CIA to exercise this “fifth function” for the purposes 
of covert action, it must satisfy two requirements.  First, the President must find 
that the action is in the U.S. national security interests.  At the time, these 
“Presidential Findings” –as they have come be known –came either in writing or 
by verbal command.236  Additionally under Hughes-Ryan was the requirement 
that the President notify the appropriate Congressional Committees (8 in number) 
                                                 
232 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403 (d) (5); First exercise of this authority was conducted 
pursuant to NSC-4/A. 
233 Supra Richelson, p.17.; See also: Supra Dycus, et al p.433 (noting that the issue of covert action was never 
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Damrosch, Lori Fisler, “Covert Operations.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No.4, The 
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Executive Order 12, 333 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, Sec. 1.8(e) (1981). 
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in a “timely fashion.”237  Ambiguities in what constituted a “timely fashion” were, 
as one might expect, exploited by the Executive.238  Thus, under this Amendment, 
Congressional Oversight was minimal. 
 Under the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, the system of Presidential 
Finding requirements was maintained, but the requirement for Congressional 
notification was scaled back to four, rather than eight, committees.239  
Additionally, according to the act, Congressional notification was to take place 
prior to the act, not retroactively.240  If pre-approval was determined impossible, 
the President was then required to issue a secondary finding deeming non-
notification to be the product of “extraordinary circumstances affecting vital 
interests” and would be required to nonetheless notify the Majority and Minority 
leaders of both houses of Congress and the Majority and Minority leaders of the 
intelligence committees in both houses.241  Should the President still fail to 
provide notification, he would be required to “fully inform” the intelligence 
committees in a “timely fashion” and explain the failure to notify.242 
 Taking up on the deficiencies with the previous two Congressional 
Oversight acts, the 1991 Intelligence Oversight Act243 tightened the requirements 
of the Presidential Finding.  Accordingly, the President is required to develop his 
Finding in writing,244 thereby providing a clear tie from the President to the 
policy.  Additionally, the Finding is required to identify all U.S. agencies 
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involved, any third party involved, and may not authorize any program which 
violates federal law or the Constitution or which is used to influence U.S. political 
processes, media, policies, or public opinion.245  Notification was bumped to a 48-
hour pre-event notification.246   
 From the limited knowledge publicly available regarding the third-party 
rendition program, members of the CIA, at the direction of the National Security 
Council, were asked to devise a plan as to where rendered suspects could be taken 
for interrogation.247  The plan, once formulated, was subsequently then forwarded 
to President Clinton for signature in May of 1998, formally codified in still 
classified Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62).248  Presumably, because 
this operation falls under the covert action authority of the CIA, select members 
of Congress, under the oversight requirements, should have been informed of the 
program.  As of yet, there appears to have been no such notification. 
 
2. Congressionally Mandated Torture Prohibitions  
All treaties fall into one of two categories: (a) self-sxecuting and (b) non-
self-executing.249  A self-executing treaty means that the treaty itself suffices as 
law of the land once ratified.  Non-self-executing treaties, on the other hand, 
require further codification by, for example, criminal statutes which mirror 
provisions in the treaty.  The Convention Against Torture (CAT) is non-self-
executing. Consequently, following its ratification in 1994, Congress passed a 
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criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 2340A).  Thus, in order to find the binding law 
regarding torture, one must look at the statute, not the convention.  
With regard to rendition, Art. 3 sec. 1 of the CAT explicitly forbids the 
expulsion, return, or extradition of any person to a state “where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”250  According to a Senate “understanding” attached to its ratification of 
the CAT which defines the substantial grounds requirements as to mean “if it is 
more likely than not that he would be tortured.”251  In order to determine this, the 
convention goes on to say, “competent authorities shall take into account… the 
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass 
violations of human rights.”252  With regard to all of the named countries to which 
the United States has been rendering terrorist suspects for interrogation, a prima 
facie inspection of the CAT would seem to suggest that it flatly prohibits such 
renditions.   
Because the binding source of law is derived from the statute and not the 
treaty, however, these provisions cannot be considered to be a binding 
prohibition.  The statute, interestingly, does not prohibit those renditions.  Instead, 
it merely prohibits the act of torture itself.  One exception to that may be, of 
course, if the particular scheme could be considered conspiracy to commit 
                                                 
250 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,  Adopted 
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torture.253  Nonetheless, unless the elements of conspiracy can be met, which is 
unlikely, no grounds for statutory prosecution would appear to exist. 
It is interesting to note, however, that section 1242 the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, expresses the sense of Congress that: 
 
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of 
any person to a country in which there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the 
person is physically present in the United States.254 
 
Although this does not criminalize rendition for torture, it does mirror the 
provision in the CAT which forbids renditions for that purpose.  Consequently, 
the President, by this expression, is urged against conducting those renditions in 
times of peace.  The first question becomes, can the Executive overlook these 
provisions in times of war?  Many of the President’s lawyers, most notably former 
Deputy Attorney General John Yoo, have argued that the Commander-in-Chief 
authority grants the President precisely that authority.255  But because Congress 
alone holds the Constitutional authority to create the laws of war,256 if Congress 
intended it to apply in wartime, then there is little doubt that the President would 
be bound.  Thus, the essential question becomes, did Congress intend for this 
prohibition to include times of war? 
 If interpretation were to go back to the CAT, the answer is relatively clear: 
Article 2 explicitly provides no exception for torture in wartime.  Presumably, the 
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following prohibition on renditions for torture would be included in that article.  It 
is conceivable, one might presume, that an interpretation would not return to 
CAT, instead looking solely at the statutes and acts of Congress.  No statute or act 
discusses war as an exception, thereby leaving one with one of either two 
interpretations: (a) it is to apply only in times of peace because Congress would 
have explicitly mentioned the wartime element as a recognition of their duty to 
make the laws of armed conflict, or (b) the Congressional will is presumed to 
apply in times of war as well because no equivocation was provided to the 
contrary.  Which of those presumptions is employed will likely determine the 
outcome of the interpretation.  
 In an effort to ensure that all states complied with the basic premises of 
human rights amidst the GWOT, the United Nations security counsel passed a 
resolutions which commands states to “ensure that any measure taken to combat 
terrorism complies with all their obligations under international law, and should 
adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular 
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”257 
The second question which arises is that of whether the “substantial 
grounds” test has been passed.  It was, as a former lawyer with the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has put it, “the Convention only applies when 
you know a suspect is more likely than not to be torture, but what if you kind of 
know?  That’s not enough.  So there are ways to get around it.”258  Because the 
CIA has apparently rendered most of its suspects to countries which are listed 
                                                 
257 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456, S/RES/1456 (2003) 
258 Supra Mayer 
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human rights abusers and are well-documented in their use of torture, and the 
CAT indicates the method of identifying “substantial grounds” for torture by 
looking at the given state’s record, it would seem at first impression reasonable to 
presume that they might be tortured.  This is particularly true in light of the value 
of whatever information may be obtained through the use of unscrupulous means.  
To dodge the issue, the CIA has reportedly obtained executive agreements259 of 
some kind from these states to the effect that they will not be tortured.260 Such an 
agreement, the Administration would claim, waives any CAT objection.  Because 
the United States has obtained a signed commitment from the foreign 
interrogators, it is no longer “more likely than not,” that the suspects will be 
tortured, per the Senate understanding.  No interested party is under the illusion 
that the suspects will be treated well, the sole question is whether the expected ill-
treatment is tantamount to torture.  “The idea that we’re gonna suddenly throw 
our hands up like Claude Raines in ‘Casablanca’,” one former CIA official has 
said,  “and say, ‘I’m shocked that justice in Egypt isn’t like it is in Milwaukee,’ 
there’s a certain disingenousness to that.”261 
Others have questioned the validity of such agreements.262  Torture is 
method of punishment or information acquisition endemic in the law enforcement 
or intelligence services of certain states, particularly within those to which the 
United States seems to be rendering suspected terrorists.  The concern, for many 
                                                 
259Supra 60 Minutes 
260 Id.  It is unclear as to whether these agreements were ever signed, according to Michael Scheurer, a former 
high level CIA official. 
261 Supra 60 Minutes 
262 Human Rights Watch, “Diplomatic Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture,” 
Human Rights Watch Report, Vol.16, No.4(D), April 2004;  Human Rights Watch, “Still At Risk: 
Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture,” Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 17, No.4 (D). 
April 2005. 
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of the critics, is that “where governments routinely deny that torture is practiced, 
despite the fact that it is systematic or widespread, official assurances cannot be 
considered reliable.”263   
Agreements between an Executive department of one state and the 
Executive department of another are not rare.  Indeed, many elements of mutual 
legal assistance and intelligence cooperation are found within such agreements, 
and typically bring with them weight of law.264  But for an international 
agreement of the sort to have force and effect within the domestic arena, it must 
first go through the Department of State.265  In order to ensure that such 
agreements are carried out in accordance with American foreign policy 
objectives, statutory law, and the Constitution, the State Department maintains 
procedures266 requiring basic Congressional consultation and approval by the 
Secretary of State or his designee.267  National security related agreements 
provide no exception.268  Under revised editions of the Case-Zablocki Act, the 
Department of State was bequeathed the burden to approve all Executive 
agreements.269  Title 22, section 181.7(c) of the Code of Federal Regulations goes 
further, requiring the production of a summary, citation of legal authority, 
background, and rationale addendum to accompany every international 
                                                 
263 Human Rights Watch “Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture,” Human 
Rights Watch Vol. 16 No. 4 (D) p.4 
264 See: Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding a claims agreement sufficiently binding on 
the basis of Congressional acquiescence and established Executive custom). 
265 Robert Dalton, “Treaties and Other International Agreements,” Chapter 18 of Supra Moore, et al, p.889-
892. 
266 11 F.A.M. 720, U.S. Dept’t St., revised February 25, 1985, (known as Circular 175 Procedure). 
267 Id.; Supra Dalton 
268 Id. 
269 Case-Zablocki Act, 1 USC 112b; Distinguishing authority for executive agreements from treaties is often 
difficult.  As one commentator has noted, “[o]ne is compelled to conclude that there are agreements which 
the President can make on his sole authority and others which he can make only with the consent of the 
Senate, but [no one]… has told us which are which.” (Henkin, Louis, “Litigating the President’s Power to 
Terminate Treaties,” American Journal of International Law, 73 Am. J. Intl. L. 647, 1979.) 
 
64 
agreement.270  According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the Secretary of State is to annually submit a report 
containing an index of all such agreements, including those not publicly listed by 
the Department, to the Congress.271  They may even be submitted in classified 
form.272  Although it remains difficult to assess, in light of classification, no 
evidence points to these procedures being applied with respect to those 
agreements that might ostensibly waive CAT objections.  In the absence of this 
procedure being followed, one is left to conclude that such arrangements lack the 
weight of law.  From a jurisprudential standpoint, it would seem that a weightless 
Executive agreement would be insufficient to qualify as vitiating the otherwise 
present “substantial grounds” for believing that one may be tortured.  Had 
policymakers intended such actions to be genuine, binding Executive agreement 
would certainly provide a crucial baseline for their case.  
 
3. Federal Kidnapping Statute 
When forcible abductions are used as a method of rendering one to court, 
the abduction is generally executed in accordance with the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and statutory authority guiding the power of arrest.273  Thus, 
the abduction is, in effect, an arrest.  Under this framework then, the act is not 
kidnapping in the same sense as might be understood as a crime.  If, as in the case 
                                                 
270 22 C.F.R. pt. 181l; See generally Supra Dalton 
271 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, PL 108-408 §§ 7211-7214,. 118 Stat. 3638, 
3825-3832 (2004). 
272 Id. 
273 See monograph I. 
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of Frisbie v. Collins,274 the abductors act outside of their jurisdiction or under the 
color of official capacity, the abduction is a crime.275  Intelligence officers, unlike 
those belonging to the law enforcement community carrying out forcible 
abductions for criminal prosecution, lack express Congressionally recognized 
authority to arrest or detain.276   Kidnapping, when utilized for purposes other 
than criminal prosecution, does not fall within the scope of official right, and thus 
should be viewed as a violation of federal criminal law.   Although courts have 
not yet fully ruled on the matter, overt acts of torture, for example, are no likely 
less judicable because they were carried out under the ostensible color of 
Executive authority.277  After all, instructions by the President “cannot change the 
nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions 
would have been a plain trespass.”278  
18 USC§1201(a) provides that whoever “unlawfully seizes, confines, 
inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts or carries away and holds for ransom or 
reward,” any person may face life in prison.279  Importantly, Congress chose to 
extend jurisdiction within the statute to include special aircraft jurisdiction.280  
Special aircraft jurisdiction includes civilian aircraft of the United States, aircraft 
of the American armed forces, and “any other aircraft leased without crew to a 
                                                 
274 Supra Frisbie v. Collins 
275 See monograph I. 
276 The Administration would contend that authority for detention and the rendering thereof may be found 
within the CIA’s “Fifth Function” general covert action authority.   
277 The issue has never been squarely addressed.  In Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (2000), the D.C. Court 
of Appeals found that 5th Amendment rights of a non-citizen living abroad were particularly limited, but the 
issue of criminal sanction for kidnapping may be distinguished from this case because it is under the 
application of an extraterritorial criminal statute and not a Constitutional right that action may be taken.  A 
criminal statute which expressly permits extraterritorial application is not the same as a Constitutional right 
which has been found not to extend as far. 
278 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) 
279 18 U.S.C. §1201(a) 
280 Id. 
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lessee whose principal place of business is in the United States or, if the lessee 
does not have a principal place of business, whose permanent residence is in the 
United States.” 281  In so far as media reporting may be relied upon for fact 
patterns, most planes used by the CIA appear to be rented or leased from 
American companies.282  One Gulfstream V jet suspected of being used in these 
operations, for instance, originally operated with the tail number N379P,283 
subsequently changed to N8068V.284  The markings are designated, under 
provisions provided in accordance with the Chicago Convention,285 as originating 
from the United States.  Other stories illustrate similar evidence.286  They are, in 
other words, American jets.  And with American jets, the statute provides, comes 
American criminal jurisdiction for kidnapping. 
No doubt, no federal agent is likely to investigate, nor any United States 
Attorney’s office prosecute, although the presence of not only a law but one 
which provides criminal sanction for extraterritorial kidnapping by those who use 
American aircraft in their scheme, Congressional will is surely clear.  Kidnapping, 
absent law enforcement arrest authority,287 is unacceptable. 
 
 4. Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
Across the spectrum of challenged action undertaken by the President 
within the GWOT context, an ever expanding claim has been proffered that the 
                                                 
281 49 U.S.C §46501 
282 Supra Mayer; Supra 60 Minutes 
283 Id. 
284 Supra Grey 
285 Supra Chicago Convention 
286 Supra 60 Minutes 
287 See monograph I for more on the law enforcement exception. 
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AUMF grants Congressional assent for the President to conduct whatever actions 
he deems critical to fighting the so-called war.288  Whatever the legal status of 
third-party interrogative renditions may have been prior to its passage, when 
Congress affirmatively assented to the President’s authority to “use all necessary 
and appropriate force”289 against those allegedly affiliated with al-Qa’eda, new 
questions arose within the spectrum of Chief Executive authority.  One would 
assume such authority applies to both the province of intelligence as well as the 
military.  The question, in as far as invocation of Chief Executive status may be 
concerned, becomes whether Congress can reasonably be said to have intended 
inclusion of such authority in its AUMF.  According to the Supreme Court in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, when considering the scope of the AUMF for detention of 
those identified as combatants, “detention of individuals falling into the limited 
category we are considering… is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war 
as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has 
authorize the President to use.”290  Although renditions for the purposes of 
detention are not themselves detentions –after all, simple detentions may take 
place without the assistance of any third party –the intricate methods utilized by 
the President to effectuate detention are bound not by Congress, but solely by the 
laws of war.  Without a doubt, the power to wage war is the “power to wage the 
                                                 
288 A similar such claim has been made in the case of direct use of “tough interrogation” techniques on 
unlawful enemy combatants (see generally: Greenberg, Karen J. and Joshua L. Dratel, Torture Papers: The 
Road to Abu Ghraib, Cambridge University Press, 2005) and the National Security Agency’s warrantless 
intercepts (see generally: McNabb, Douglas C. and Matthew R. McNabb, “Of Bugs, the President, and the 
NSA,” The Champion, March 2006, accessed online via: 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/b50aa789eaec935a852571170070c49a?OpenDocument). 
289 Supra AUMF 
290 Hamdi et al v. Rumsfeld et al, 542 US 507 (2004). 
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war successfully,”291 but –as discussed further in the next section –the scope of 
that authority necessarily falls within the confines of jus belli. 
 
5. Congressional Acquiescence 
 Regardless of whether the AUMF is to be read as authorizing third party 
interrogative renditions, general public knowledge of these programs is abound. 
International human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch292 and the 
Council of Europe,293 have issued successive reports detailing alleged renditions 
of the sort; government inquiries in Italy,294 Germany,295 Sweden,296 Canada,297 
the United Kingdom,298 and Spain,299 among others, have investigated –and in 
some cases found –apparent instances where renditions had in some part occurred 
on their territory; and media reports have proliferated in nearly every language.  
Members of Congress are no doubt presently aware, and for several years have 
been aware, of the program’s existence.  Acquiescent failure on the part of 
Congress to contradict apparent Presidential authorization, some may contend, is 
                                                 
291 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) 
292 Human Rights Watch “Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt,” March 2005, Vol. 17, No. 5 
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293 Marty, Dick. “Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States.” Information 
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tantamount to its consent.  This interpretation is underscored upon inquiry into the 
legislative record.  In December of 2005, the wily Congressman Edward Markey 
(D) of Massachusetts authored H. Res. 593, directing cabinet officials to provide 
information regarding the program,300 a move roundly supported by the American 
Bar Association, New York University, Human Rights First, and the World 
Organization for Human Rights First USA.  Congressman Markey further 
introduced H.R. 952, the Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act of 2005, seeking to 
expressly prohibit renditions to any country identified by the International 
Relations Committee or otherwise known for its use of torture.  Two additional 
resolutions, H.Res. 624 and H.Res. 642, addressed issues relating to the 
application of the Geneva Conventions and Convention Against Torture as it 
applies to detentions in amidst the GWOT.301  All such measures failed.  .  Indeed, 
whether Congressional officials knew of the rendition program before this date or 
not is immaterial to the capacity to end –or to some degree tailor –the program in 
its current stage.  In the face of successive attempts by Congressmen to alter the 
status quo passing ignored, as the media, international human rights 
organizations, and foreign governments publicly discussing the program, 
Congress stood still with respect to the narrow issue of third party interrogative 
renditions specifically and, in so doing, affirmed the President’s authority. 
 
B. Renditions and Power as Commander-in-Chief  
                                                 
300 United States House of Representatives, H.Res. 593 (2005) 
301 United States House of Representatives H.Res. 624 (2005); United States House of Representatives H.Res 
642 (2005). 
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As a nation at war, the President is ensured significant Constitutional 
authority to provide security for the nation and its interests.302  But though such 
general authority exists independent of Congressional will, its scope may be 
narrowed through law, to varying degrees dependent upon the “gravity of the 
situation confronting the nation.”303  Gravity is generally calculated by 
comprehending the situation as one of two divergent forms of warfare: general or 
imperfect.304  Were the war deemed imperfect, or partial, “its extent and operation 
depend on our municipal laws.”305  In an instance of general warfare however, “its 
extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a 
part of the law of nations.”306  No President is granted carte blanche, even under a 
blanket AUMF.307  
Should one conclude that the GWOT is of an imperfect or partial nature, 
one is reverted largely back to the discussion relative to the AUMF.  But 
characterization of the GWOT in those terms may not be so appropriate.  
Instigation by al-Qa’eda affiliated terrorists in 2001 has been deemed an act of 
war.308  In those instances of sudden and severe attacks against the United States, 
Presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief is undoubtedly significant,309 and 
                                                 
302 Such protective authority applies not only in times of war.  See: Supra In Re Neagle (stating in part, “Who 
can doubt the authority of the President or of one of the executive departments under him to make an order 
for the protection of the mail, and of the persons and lives of its carriers.”). 
303 Supra Steel Seizure Case 
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a state.  Its scope is underscored by the Congressional assent to the AUMF. 
309 Original drafts of the Constitution provided that Congress shall have the power to “make war,” but upon 
the suggestion of Constitutional Convention delegates Madison and Gerry, the clause was altered to read 
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the acts likely of a general nature.  Indeed, in nearly every ruling relative to the 
status of those dubbed combatants within the GWOT, courts have systematically 
presumed the absence of “municipal laws” binding the President.310  Such rulings 
instead turn on the application of laws of war, most notably the Geneva 
Conventions.  Application of the Conventions may come in one of two capacities, 
entirely dependant upon how the federal government chooses to define them, 
combatants or noncombatants. 
  
1. Combatants 
If the government were to treat those who are rendered as combatants, 
several provisions of the Third Geneva Convention should be applied.  All 
combatants are de facto to be considered Prisoners of War (POWs), and are to be 
afforded those rights which follow, unless a “competent tribunal” is convened as 
determines otherwise.311  Article 12 of the convention permits prisoner transfers 
(or renditions) only to states that are parties to the convention and that will fully 
protect the rights of such POWs.  As stated by one author, “where it appears that 
POW privileges will be denied, the original Detaining Power is under an 
obligation to take custody back and to transfer the POWs to a place of internment 
where their rights will be respected.”312  Consequently, it would seem, once 
considered a POW, the government would be obliged not to render any person for 
the purposes of interrogation.   The Executive would likely get around this issue 
                                                                                                                                     
“declare  war,” a shift which as been interpreted as intending to allow the President to respond to sudden 
attacks.  See: Supra Dycus et al, p.22-23. 
310 Supra Hamdi et al  v. Rumsfeld et al 
311 Art. 5, Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) 
(October 21, 1950). 
312 Supra Fitzpatrick 
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by noting its assurance provided by the interrogating state that no torture would 
take place, once again calling into question the validity of those assurances. 
More likely however, the President will continue to view suspected 
terrorists as unlawful or unprivileged combatants.313  As unprivileged combatants, 
these persons are protected only by the general Common Article 3 which prohibits 
the infringement of only the most basic human rights.314  It is unlikely that these 
renditions would be interpreted to be in violation of those common codes. The 
problem with the Executive’s assertion that those being rendered are unprivileged 
combatants however, is that, as stated above, no combatant may be stripped of his 
POW rights until a competent tribunal has made such a ruling.315  As one D.C. 
federal district court judge ruling in the Hamdan case noted, “the President is not 
a tribunal.”316  Consequently, barring such a tribunal stripping one of POW status, 
no such rendition is likely lawful under the convention. 
 
2. Noncombatants 
A second route that might be taken by the government is to assert that 
these individuals are not combatants at all, but are merely individuals who have 
knowledge of other combatants, thereby casting them outside of the laws of war 
altogether.  The problem with this interpretation lies within the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which protects the rights of civilians in time of war.  Under this 
convention, rules for transfer are very strict, largely providing only for transfer to 
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provide safety for civilians from armed conflict, and thus would likely prohibit 
these renditions.  Further, proceedings are to be held on a regular basis to 
determine status, always determining whether or not continued internment is 
necessary.  These proceedings have not been provided –at least by all accounts –
and it will likely be impracticable for them to be provided under the conditions of 
rendition know to date.  As such, it would appear, renditions would not be 
permitted under this interpretation either, leaving the Commander-in-Chief bound 
from pursuing third party interrogative renditions not merely by acts of Congress, 
but by the laws of war. 
 
3. Customary International Humanitarian Law 
 The laws of war are seldom understood to apply only to those 
circumscribed by treaty.  Indeed, the presence of customary international 
humanitarian law is often the very basis for the assertion of criminal and civil 
jurisdiction, and serves as a guide to interpreting procedural and substantive areas 
of law within the codified treaties.  In addition to customary international legal 
objections raised within the context of extraterritorial forcible abductions for 
prosecutorial purposes,317 other norms may apply within the extraordinary 
rendition context.  Perhaps most important among them is one potential norm 
prohibiting “enforced disappearance;”318 that is,  
the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or 
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, 
                                                 
317 See monograph 1 
318 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: 
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a State or a political organization, followed by a 
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom 
or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of 
those persons, with the intention of removing them 
from the protection of the law for a prolonged 
period of time.319   
 
Although the corpus of international humanitarian law typically does not grant 
appearance to the term, some argue that it may be gleaned from a host of other 
practices, namely the norms relating to registration procedures and transparency 
of process, and those prohibiting arbitrary detention and torture, providing for the 
norm nonetheless.320  The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, 
though not assented to by Congress and therefore not a part of the directly 
applicable laws of war, has taken it one step further, defining the systematic 
practice of enforced disappearance as a species of crime against humanity.321  
With over 100 nations around the world assenting to this definition, some might 
argue, a clear norm has been carved.  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has even applied a due diligence obligation upon States, mandating that all efforts 
be made to prevent enforced disappearances.322  Ultimately, as an international 
legal custom and not a codified treaty, the extent to which “enforced 
disappearance” may be viewed as binding the President’s Commander-in-Chief 
authority, in so far as the domestic legal sphere may be concerned, is limited, 
perhaps triggering general international relations concerns instead.323 
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C. Third-Party Interrogative Renditions and Foreign Affairs 
Authority of the President in foreign affairs is firm and autonomous, not 
requiring “as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”324  No doubt, as the 
Supreme Court has found, “into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot 
intercede; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”325  But negotiation is 
distinct from exercise.  And the authority of the President is limited to the extent 
to which affirmative actions taken by the President are approved in accordance 
with the general will of the Senate, as expressed through assent to treaties.326  
Consequently, to ascertain the scope of latitude granted the President in exercising 
his foreign affairs authority, one must look to the applicable treaties.  
 
1. CAT Ascension as Senatorial Expression 
As discussed above, the anti-torture and rendition provisions provided for 
within the CAT, and subsequently interpreted by the Senate upon ascension, plays 
an important role in defining the legal status of those agreements obtained by 
foreign intelligence services not to torture those rendered.  Whereas the dictates of 
the Case-Ziblocki executive agreement scheme may themselves proves sufficient 
to vitiate their validity, international legal conceptions of such agreements may do 
the same.  The form of agreement within the international legal sphere which 
                                                                                                                                     
accepted as species of preemptory norm, and exercised recently within the United Kingdom on universal 
jurisdiction grounds, whether renditions for this purpose may be included remains unclear, although would 
seem unlikely where executive agreements intended to wave CAT objections are in place. 
324 Supra Curtiss-Wright 
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appears to most resemble those used to waive CAT objections is a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU).  It is the general practice within the United States to 
accept MOUs as legally binding.327  Indeed, in many cases senior policymakers 
are compelled to submit their communiqués, minutes, or joint statements before 
their lawyers so as to ensure that their actions are not considered binding 
declarations.328  With the exception of the United Kingdom and a number of the 
former Commonwealth countries,329 this appears to be the general practice among 
all states.  The International Court of Justice, for instance, found that minutes 
signed by the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and Qatar constituted binding law, 
despite the Foreign Minister of Bahrain’s belief to the contrary.330  As one 
commentator has noted, “the degree to which a MOU is binding is a matter for the 
intention of those who made it… A MOU made between two Government 
departments or agencies may be a binding treaty for the States parties to it.”331  
The question it would seem then, is one largely of intent.  Do the states intend for 
the agreement to be binding? 
In the instant case, it remains unclear.  On the one hand, were the United 
States not intending for the interrogating state to bleed its practices beyond the 
scope of the CAT, it would seem equally effective for the United States to 
conduct the interrogations itself.  In other words, why send alleged terrorists to 
Uzbekistan or Egypt for interrogation when members of the American military, 
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law enforcement, or intelligence communities can conduct the interrogations 
themselves, unless of course it wished for those states to breach the MOU.  On the 
other hand however, American officials are duly aware, particularly in light of 
revelations regarding prisoner abuse in American facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that torture is both anomalous with soft-power 
attributes of an ideological warfare and often yield operationally unsubstantiated 
flows of information.  Thus, in a sense, though practice appears to signify 
apparent inclination toward a breach in the MOU, its evident counterproductivity 
would seem indicative of a hesitance to do so.  At the time of this writing 
however, insufficient open-source information would appear to fairly reconcile 
this apparent contradiction regarding intent.  As a result, any legal analysis 
regarding the international viability of the MOUs would necessarily require one to 
withhold judgment until such facts are made available. 
 
2. Chicago Convention for Aviation Regulations 
 Virtually all aircraft in the world fly in accordance with certain 
regulations.  As with most laws within the international context, these regulations 
are provided basis in treaty, namely the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation.332  
According to that convention, aircrafts –civil333 and state run334 –are not permitted 
to conduct any flight which violates the laws and regulations of the state whose 
facilities it uses.335  States in turn, as a trend, typically prohibit the use of these 
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facilities in the commission of a crime.  Use of these facilities in a kidnapping, no 
doubt a crime in nearly any conceivable jurisdiction, may then be prohibited 
under the convention.  Similar concurrent restrictions are in place for military 
flights based overseas. 
 
3. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) 
 Application of foreign laws to American military forces abroad is guided 
principally under the auspices of those treaties negotiated between the United 
States and the host country, known as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).  
Agreements of this sort exist with every place in which the American military 
maintains a presence.336  At present however, allegations surrounding forcible 
abductions for third party interrogative purposes have principally taken place 
within the territory of NATO member states.  NATO’s SOFA has been in effect 
since 1949.  Under this agreement, all military officers and their civilian 
components, are obliged “to respect the law of the receiving state,”337 including 
those acts performed under the color of official duty,338 even in times of war.339  
Primary criminal jurisdiction is granted to the host state for crimes committed 
within its territory.340  Similar provisions are provided for under other SOFAs, 
including addenda to this agreement.341  Kidnapping, no doubt, is a crime in 
virtually any jurisdiction.  As a result, it would appear, forcible abductions carried 
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out by American military officers or their civilian components are in violation of 
the SOFA.  The only question which remains is whether members of the CIA may 
be considered “civilian components.”   According to the NATO-SOFA, a 
“civilian component” refers to “civilian personnel accompanying a force of a 
Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that Contracting 
Party, and who are not stateless persons…”342  Although members of the CIA are 
not, in so far as American legal standards are so concerned, “in the employ of an 
armed service.”  They are, instead civilian government employees, though not 
sufficiently representative of American policy so as to qualify for diplomatic 
immunity and therefore would fall more squarely under the scope of the Chicago 
Convention.  But, according to allegations surrounding several known instances 
of third party interrogative rendition, though the act abduction and transportation 
may itself involve CIA officers, and not military officials, military air bases, like 
Aviano Air Force Base in Italy,343 have allegedly been used as points of exit.  
Were military officials, or their civilian components, aware of the operation, 
apparent complicity may, in certain instances, fall within the scope of criminal 
conspiracy, and thus be prohibited by the SOFA.   
  
V. Case Examples: Flights to Egypt 
If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan.  If you want 
them to be tortured, you send them to Syria.  If you want someone to disappear –
never to see them again, you send them to Egypt.344 
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Egypt’s record on torture is clear, all the more so when involving the 
interrogation of Islamist militants.  According to a recent report by the Human 
Rights Watch, methods of torture typically include “beatings with fists, feet, 
leather straps, sticks, and electric cables; suspension in contorted and painful 
positions accompanied by beatings; the application of electric shocks; and sexual 
intimidation and violence.”345  In April of 2005 an Egyptian government 
sponsored National Council for Human Rights admitted that torture is a part of 
“normal investigative practice” there.346  The United Nations Committee Against 
Torture and the United Nations Human Rights Committee have routinely 
condemned Egypt for its use of these techniques.  In response, Egypt has, to date, 
refused to permit the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit.347  The U.S. 
State Department has, as late its most recent report on Human Rights for activities 
in 2004, detailed numerous occasions in which torture was administered among 
other forms of detainee abuse.348 
It comes as a great surprise then, that the CIA, as a part of its interrogative 
rendition program, has apparently sent a number of suspected terrorists to Egypt 
for questioning.  El-Aqrab, the 320-cell inner sanctum of the Torah prison, has 
held some of the world’s most infamous Islamists from Ayman al-Zawahiri to the 
intellectual extremist and radical author Sayyid Qutb.349  Now, it is believed, cells 
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of solitary confinement are racked with American targets, amidst whispers of a 
newly built detention center in the Upper Nile.350   
Muhammad al-Zawahiri, a graduate of engineering from Cairo University, 
businessman, and brother of Ayman al-Zarahiri, was indicted in 1981 and 
subsequently acquitted for an alleged role in the assassination of President Anwar 
Sadat, but was long suspected by the Egyptian government for ties with radical 
Islamist militants.351  In fear of being retried for his supposed involvement in the 
Sadat assassination, Muhammad joined the Saudi government-endorsed World 
Islamic Relief Organization, providing architectural assistance to efforts to build 
schools and hospitals throughout Indonesia, Bosnia, Malawi, and elsewhere 
throughout the Muslim World.352  Aftern an Egyptian imam had been arrested in 
Jeddah at the request of the Egyptian government, Muhammad began to feel 
increasingly less secure in Saudi Arabia, he fled with his family to Yemen, and 
then to Sudan where he was reunited with his brother Ayman until being forced 
out in 1995.353  Once thrown out of Sudan, Muhammad took his wife and six 
children back to Yemen where he traveled frequently for work with engineering 
contractors in the United Arab Emirates.354  Sometime in March or April of 1999 
Egyptian authorities, with apparent American assistance,355 forcibly abducted 
Muhammad.356   
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Meanwhile, Muhammad’s other brother, Hussain, was driving to work in 
Malaysia where he was abducted, allegedly with CIA assistance, detained for 
thirty-six hours, blindfolded, handcuffed, and flown to Cairo.357  Six months later, 
finally recognizing that he posed no threat nor had any valuable information for 
Egyptian authorities, Hussain was released into his family’s hands.  Following his 
release, Hussain has been expressly forbidden from discussing his experience 
with anyone, although it is widely believed that he had been subjected to torture 
and other forms of maltreatment. Muhammad, on the other, would not be heard 
from for years to come.   
Following the October 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan, “rumors 
circulated… that Muhammad had been executed, and that the Americans asked 
the Egyptian government for a sample of his DNA from the dead body to match it 
with that of a skull found in Tora Bora, which they suspected was Ayman al-
Zawahiri.”358  Three years later, when most had long presumed Muhammad dead, 
a London-based news service announced that he was still alive and in Egyptian 
custody in the Torah prison complex.  The following week, the Egyptian Minister 
of Interior confirmed the report, and announced that the Egyptian government had 
decided to retry Muhammad in a military tribunal.  Fourteen days later, 
Muhammad’s family were permitted to meet with him, where they learned he had 
been severely beaten and likely hung from the ceiling by his wrists for prolonged 
periods of time.  He had apparently spent some four and a half years in an 
Egyptian intelligence service detention center where he was denied sunlight and 
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fresh air, so as not to disrupt the interrogation, among other things.  Apparently, at 
some point in the process, Muhammad had already been tried by a military 
tribunal, where he was sentenced to death.  To date Muhammad has not be 
executed and, as his lawyer has said, “he has been sentenced to death by a 
military tribunal, but they have put all of the legal procedures aside.”359  He still 
sits to await an unknown fate.360 
Muhammad was not alone.  Walking back from class in downtown 
Stockholm on December 18, 2001, a one Ahmad Hussain Mustafa Agiza –an 
Egyptian living in Sweden –was forcibly abducted by unnamed Swedish security 
officials, and placed onto an American Gulfstream jet headed for Cairo, along 
with another Egyptian abductee, Muhammad Ibrahim Sulaiman al-Zari.  
Assurances were granted to Swedish officials by Egyptian authorities, that the two 
“would not be subject to the death penalty, torture or ill-treatment, and would 
receive fair trials.”361  According to reports, Egypt has failed to live up to that 
agreement.362  
 
VI. Political Fallout 
 Extraterritorial forcible abductions for the purposes of prosecution alone 
pose a considerable risk to the political legitimacy of the state, but when those 
abductions are aimed at clandestine interrogations by known human rights 
abusers, the ideological and intellectual American image is markedly tattered.  In 
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this post-Cold War state of affairs, whereby the globalizing forces of economy 
and commerce push upward the universal significance of non-state actors, we 
must learn to engage and win in the struggle of the mind.  Terrorists, for example, 
threaten our security, but what’s worse is that they threaten the very ideological 
premises underpinning that security, namely the American troika of democracy, 
capitalism, and liberal values expressed in what some so broadly dub “the 
American way of life.”  And on that battlefield, this nation has largely failed to 
show up.  Where in the period of bipolar Cold War politics the ideological 
competition was matched between Soviet and American interpretations of ethical 
governance, that marketplace is now open not only to other state-centric 
interpretations, but non-state interpretations as well.  A double-edged externality 
of globalization has thus arisen: he with a message has a voice.  When viewed 
from the marketplace of ideas, America’s is a commodity of tremendous appeal.  
America offers the promise that one and one’s progeny will be secure from the 
rancor of an overbearing state while guaranteeing autonomy to pursue individual 
interests in politics, in business, and in society.  And so, American policymakers 
should recognize, America must firmly assert its hand, lest the desire for 
antiterrorism order outweigh the prospect of those attractive values it offers.   
 In this vein, every revelation of another rendered suspected terrorist to 
countries like Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Syria, is another win for those who seek to 
illustrate the ideological hypocrisy of the American cause, and in turn an 
important win for terrorists in the marketplace of ideas.  Only by conceiving this 
world on a two dimensional battlefield, the hard power ends relative to force and 
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the soft power ends relative to will, can any demonstrable victory within the 
GWOT be found.  Whatever their legal status, third-party interrogative renditions 
are an anathema to the triumph of personal dignity and of the due process 
measures instilled to provide it.  From the political metric of their application 
then, the program must be suspended. 
  
VII. How to End the Program 
Although President Clinton took the first step in authorizing the third party 
interrogative rendition program and President Bush the second in reasserting its 
use in the post 11 September world, others are not powerless to act.  For one, the 
power of the purse is considerable.363  Congress controls the money of 
government, in all of its many manifestations, and may refuse funding to any 
program it deems unnecessary, unconstitutional, or otherwise undesirable.  
Although some Congressman sought to withhold funding for these renditions, all 
such efforts as yet have failed.  Were these members successful in raising 
significant public discontent against this rendition program, perhaps a sufficient 
majority may include a provision in a classified appropriations bill prohibiting the 
expenditure of funds for the program.  And although the President would 
undoubtedly contend that his Commander-in-Chief authority outweighs such 
appropriations because “the power of the purse may [not] be Constitutionally 
exercised to produce an unconstitutional result,”364 Congress may revert back to 
the assertion that the laws of war prohibit such renditions and therefore limit his 
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Commander-in-Chief powers.  With limited exceptions, it is the “plain and 
explicit duty of the executive branch… to comply” with such appropriations.365  
Few courts have struck down appropriation limitations on such grounds.366 
But Congress’s authority is not solely confined to appropriations.  Indeed, 
the CIA itself bases its power in statutory law.  Vagueness in the scope of its 
“fifth function” authority has granted tremendous latitude to its exercise.  The 
1947 National Security Act, constituting the agency’s bedrock authority, could be 
amended so as to expressly prohibit third party interrogative renditions, and any 
other undesirable actions of the sort.  Though this may cause a greater push 
toward the use of military assets for the same purpose, it would a step toward 
ending the overall program.  Where further Congressional actions, like revisions 
of the torture statute, the recent McCain Amendment regarding torture,367 or other 
such additions, might be overlooked by a President in wartime, base authority for 
the institution itself likely could not be so ignored. 
A third remedy may lie in the hands of foreign authorities.  By conducting 
these operations, the officers of the CIA are overtly violating the sovereign law of 
the host state; kidnapping is kidnapping.  As a result, these states maintain 
criminal jurisdiction over them.  Were states to begin seeking criminal 
prosecution against these officers, the agency may be more hesitant to continue 
the program.  Likewise, political fallout could prove overwhelming.  One court in 
Italy, for example, has pursued precisely this course by issuing Italian and 
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European368 arrest warrants for 25 officers of the CIA allegedly involved in the 
forcible abduction and subsequent rendering of an Egyptian imam from the streets 
of northern Milano.369  Outrage in Italy, and indeed across Europe, has been 
immense, threatening the delicate post-Iraq transatlantic alliance and furthering 
the perception of American “imperial hubris”370 across Western Europe.  Though 
political and not legal in nature, this repercussions emanating from this legal 
action could suffice to draw down the frequency of the program use, to a point 
where they could be more fairly described as “extraordinary” methods of 
rendition. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 The CIA’s third party interrogative rendition program has been the cause 
of considerable degradation to American credibility abroad; a credibility it must 
have to win the truly worldwide and multi-dimensional war against al-Qa’eda.  
Legal claims by the Executive in turn have mirrored the broader case for 
Presidential wartime autonomy historically wrought amongst the greatest of 
abuses now shunned by history.  For now these renditions continue, and likely 
will continue, until Congress take an affirmative stance against their use or 
foreign actors obstruct the American intelligence community sufficient to render 
them at once impracticable. 
 
                                                 
368 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 13 June 2002, accessed via: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_190/l_19020020718en00010018.pdf. 
369 Whitlock, Craig, “European Investigate CIA Role in Abductions.”  Washington Post, Sunday, March 13, 
2005, A01. 
370 See generally: Scheuer, Michael, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing The War on Terror, Potomac 
Books, Inc., March 2005. 
 
88 
 
Principal Sources Consulted 
 
Books, Journals, News, Periodicals: 
 
Abramovsky, Abraham, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The United States’ Unwarranted 
Attempt to Alter International Law in United States v. Yunis,.” Yale Journal of 
International Law, 15 Yale J. Int’l L. 121 (1990).  
 
Abrams, Norman, Anti-Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement, American Casebook 
Series, West Publishing Group, June 2003. 
 
Addicott, Jeffrey F., Terrorism Law: The Rule of Law and the War on Terror, 2nd Edition, 
Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, Inc., Tucson, Arizona, 2004. 
 
Amnesty International, “Torture and Secret Detention: Testimony of the ‘Disappeared’ in 
the ‘War on Terror,’” AMR 51/108/2005, August 4, 2005. 
 
Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants, accessed 
online via: http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/dojguidelines.pdf. 
 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 4th 2002 
Edition, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1996. p.217-295 
 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 3rd 
Edition, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1996. p.217-295 
 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 1st 
Edition, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1987. p.187-246 
 
Beeston, Richard, “CIA Made ‘185 Rendition Flights Through Britain.’”  Times of 
London, April 5, 2006. 
 
Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Random House Publishing, 
New York, NY, 2002. 
 
Bantekas, Ilias and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law: 2nd Edition, Cavendish 
Publishing, London, United Kingdom, 2003. 
 
Bohn, Michael K., The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of 
Terrorism,  Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. 
 
Centre for Human Rights, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Human Rights 
and Pre-trial Detention: A Handbook of International Standards Relating to Pre-Trial 
Detention, Professional Training Series No. 3, United Nations Publication, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 1994. 
 
CNN, “UK Memo Fuels CIA Flights Row.”  CNN Online, Thursday, January 19, 2006.  
Accessed online at:  
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/01/19/uk.rendition/index.html. 
 
89 
 
Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, 
From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Books, New York, New York, 
2004.   
 
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
found at: http://www.ararcommission.ca/. 
 
Cornell, Michael L., “A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of United Nations 
Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 16 Conn. J. Int’l L. 
325, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Spring 2005. 
 
Crewdson, John. “Italy Prosecutor, Boss Clash Over CIA Case.” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 
23, 2005. 
 
Damrosch, Lori Fisler, “Covert Operations.” The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 83, No.4, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs 
(October 1989). 
 
Dycus, Berney, Banks, Raven-Hansen, ed, National Security Law, 3rd Edition, Aspen 
Publishers, New York, New York, 2002. 
 
Dycus, Berney, Banks, Raven-Hansen, ed, National Security Law 2004-2005 
Supplement, 3rd Edition, Aspen Publishers, New York, New York, 2004. 
 
“Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004,” Department of State, Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 2005, accessed online via: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm. 
 
Evans, Scott S., “International Kidnapping In A Violent World: Where the United States 
Ought to Draw the Line,” Military Law Review, 137 Mil. L. Rev. 187, Summer 1992. 
 
Fahmi, Tarek N., “United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Extraterritorial Abduction and the 
Role of Extradition Treaties,” Western State University Law Review, Western State 
University Law Review Association, Inc., 20 W. St. U. L. Rev 695, Spring 1993. 
 
Greenberg, Karen J. and Joshua L. Dratel, Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005 
 
Grey, Stephen and Renwick McLean, “Spain Examines CIA ‘Rendition’ Flights.”  New 
York Times, Monday, November 14, 2005 
 
Hagan, Patrick M., “Government Sponsored Extraterritorial Abductions in the New 
World Order: The Unclear Role of International Law in United States Courts and Foreign 
Policy,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 17 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 438, Spring 
1994.  
 
Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules, International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2005. 
 
 
90 
Henkin, Louis, “Litigating the President’s Power to Terminate Treaties,” American 
Journal of International Law, 73 Am. J. Intl. L. 647 (1979). 
 
Hentoff, Nat, “Sweet Land of Liberty,” The Washington Times, February 28, 2005 
 
Hitz, Frederick P.  “Unleashing the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and Letting the CIA 
be the CIA,” 25 Harv. J. Law and Pub. Pol. 765, 765-66 (2002). 
 
Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses 
Worldwide,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Ppaer for the 59th Session of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, March 25, 2003. 
 
Human Rights Watch, “Diplomatic Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard 
Against Torture,” Human Rights Watch Report, Vol.16, No.4(D), April 2004 
 
Human Rights Watch, “Still At Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against 
Torture,” Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 17, No.4 (D). April 2005. 
 
Human Rights Watch “Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt,” March 
2005, Vol. 17, No. 5 (E). 
 
Jones, Q.C., Alun and Doobay, Anand, Jones and Doobay On Extradition and Mutual 
Assistance, Sweet & Maxwell, London, England, 2005.  p.3-001 – 3-026. 
 
Kash, Douglas, “Abducting Terrorists Under PDD-39: Much Ado About Nothing New,” 
The American University International Law Review, 13 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 139, 1997. 
 
Keynes, Edward, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power, Pennsylvania 
State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1982. 
 
Laflin, Melanie M., “Kidnapped Terrorists: Brining International Criminals to Justice 
through Irregular Rendition and Other Quasi-legal Options,” Journal of Legislation, 16 J. 
Legis. 315, 2000. 
 
Lee, Aimee, “United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal 
Abductions,” Fordham International Law Journal, 17 Fordham Int’l L. J. 126, 1993. 
 
Lewis, Aiden.  “Judge Issues Warrants for CIA Operatives.” The Guardian, Friday, 
December 23, 2005 
 
Lillich, Richard B. and Newman, Frank C. eds., International Human Rights: Problems of 
Law and Policy, Little Brown and Company, 1979.   
 
Marty, Dick. “Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States.” 
Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Council of 
Europe, ajdoc03 2006rev, 22 January 2006. 
 
Matorin, Mitchell J., “Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction in 
Lieu of Extradition,” Duke Law Journal, 1992 Duke L.J. 907, February 1992. 
 
Mayer, Jane, “Outsourcing Torture,” The New Yorker, February 14, 2005. 
 
91 
 
McAlister, Edmund S., “The Hydraulic Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-
Machain and the Case for Justifiable Abduction,” DePaul Law Review, 43 DePaul L. 
Rev. 449, Winter 1994. 
 
McCarthy, Peter S., “United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Extending the Ker-Frisbee 
Doctrine to Meet the Modern Challenges Posed By the International Drug Trade,” New 
England Law Review, New England School of Law, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 1067, Summer 
1993. 
 
McHam, Monica L., “All’s Well That Ends Well: A Pragmatic Look At International 
Criminal Extradition,” Houston Journal of International Law, 20 Hous. J. Int’l L. 419, 
Winter 1998. 
 
McNabb, Douglas C. and Matthew R. McNabb. “And the Gloves Came Off,” The 
European Lawyer.  October 2005.  p.38-39. 
 
McNabb, Douglas C. and Matthew R. McNabb, “Of Bugs, the President, and the NSA,” 
The Champion, March 2006, accessed online via: 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/b50aa789eaec935a852571170070c49a?OpenDocument. 
 
McNabb Associates, P.C., “McCain and the Not So Effectual Ban On Torture.” National 
Security Crimes Blog, Thursday, January 5, 2006.  Accessed via:  
http://www.nationalsecuritycrimesblog.com/2006_01_01_archive.html 
 
Michell, Paul, “English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible 
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain,” Cornell International Law Journal, 29 Cornell Int’l 
L. J. 383, 1996. 
 
Moore, John Norton and Turner, Robert F., National Security Law, 2nd Edition, Carolina 
Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2005.  p.457-487 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Diplomacy,” Staff 
Statement No. 5. 
 
Newhouse, Jr., George B., “The Long Arm of the Law: The United States Has Statutory 
Authority to Pursue Terrorists Wherever They May Be Found Throughout the World,” 
Los Angeles Lawyer, Los Angeles County Bar Association, 25 Los Angeles Lawyer 32,  
September 2002. 
 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, “Authority of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to Override International Law In Extraterritorial Law Enforcement 
Activities,” June 21, 1989. 
 
O’Higgins, Paul, “Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition,” 36 Brit. Y.B. 
International L. 279, 280 (1960). 
 
Paust, Bassiouni, Scharf, Gurule, Sadat, Zagaris, Williams, eds., International Criminal 
Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd Edition, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North 
Carolina.  2000. 
 
 
92 
Philippe, Julie and Tristan, Laurent, “International Law, Extraterritorial Abductions, and 
the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in the United States,” Williamette Journal of 
International Law and Dispute Resolution, 11 Williamette J. Int’l L. & Dispute 
Resolution, 2004. 
 
Platt, Ian J., “International Law- All Nations Beware: United States Extradition Treaty 
with Mexico Does Not Prohibit Forcible Abductions- United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992),” Suffolk University Law Review, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 271, 
Spring 1993. 
 
Prades, Maria Jesus “CIA Accused of Using Airport on Mallorca.” The Guardian, Nov. 
14, 2005. 
 
Randall, Kenneth C., “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,” University of 
Texas Law Review, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785 (1988) 
 
Rebane, Kai I., “Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need For an International 
Criminal Court to Safeguard Individual Rights,” Fordham International Law Journal, 
Fordham University School of Law, 19 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1636, April 1996. 
 
Reeve, Simon, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden, and the Future of 
Terrorism, Northeastern University Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 2002.   
 
Richelson, Jeffrey T., The U.S. Intelligence Community, Fourth Edition, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1999. p.349 
 
Robertson, Geoffrey, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, New 
Press, January 2003. 
 
Rudgers, David F., “The Origins of Covert Action.” Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 35, No.2 (April 2000). 
 
Rudy, Timothy D., “Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbee?” St. Mary’s Law Journal, St. 
Mary’s University of San Antonio, 26 St. Mary’s L. J. 791, 1995. 
 
Rychlak, Ronald J., “Humberto Alvarez-Machain v. United States: The Ninth Circuit 
Panel Decision of September 11,” Federalist Society White Paper, accessed online via: 
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/terrorism/ninth.htm 
 
Scheuer, Michael, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing The War on Terror, Potomac 
Books, Inc., March 2005. 
 
Sievert, Ronald J., Defense, Liberty, and the Constitution: Exploring the Critical National 
Security Issues of Our Time, William S. Hein & Co., Buffalo, New York, 2005.   
 
Sievert, Ronald J., Cases and Materials on U.S. Law and National Security, Fred B. 
Rothman Publications, Littleton, Colorado, 2000. 
60 Minutes, “CIA Flying Suspects to Torture?” CBS News, March 6, 2005. 
 
Shearer, I.A., Extradition in International Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
United Kingdom, 1971.  p. 67-94 
 
93 
 
Slater, Matthew A., “Trumpeting Justice: The Implications of U.S. Law and Policy for 
the International Rendition of Terrorist from Failed or Uncooperative States,” University 
of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, 12 U. Miami Intl’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 151, Summer, 2004. 
 
“Germany and Italy Want to See the CIA in Court.” Spiegel Online, Nov. 14, 2005, 
accessed at: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,384885,00.html. 
 
St. Clair, Jeffrey, “Torture Air, Incorporated: The Road to Rendition,” Counterpunch 
Online, Weekend Edition April 9/10, 2005, Oregon City, Oregon. 
 
Swedish TV4 Kalla Fakta Program, “The Broken Promise,” Monday, May 17, 2004, as 
translated and provided by Human Rights Watch at:  
http://hrw.org/english/2004/05/17/sweden8620.htm. 
 
Task Force on International Terrorism, International Terrorism: Legal Challenges and 
Responses, International Bar Associations, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, New York, 
2003. 
 
Tenet, George, “Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” March 24, 2004.   
 
Trudy, Timothy, “Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbee?” St. Mary’s Law Journal, 26 St. 
Mary’s L. J. 791, 1995.  
 
Watson, G.R.. “Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal 
Jurisdiction,” Yale Journal of International Law, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. (1992). 
 
Webb, Kandy G., “Constitutional and International Law- International Kidnapping – 
Government Illegality as a Challenge to Jurisdiction,” Tulane Law Review, Tulane 
University, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 1975. 
 
Wedgwood, Ruth, “Section Note: R. v. Horseferry Raod Magistrates’ Court, Ex Parte 
Bennett,” 89 A.J.I.L. 142, January, 1995 
 
Weissman, Kristin Berdan, “Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future 
Peace,” U.C. Davis Law Review, The Regents of the University of California, 27 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 460, Winter, 1994. 
 
Whitlock, Craig, “New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action.”  Washington Post, 
Saturday, May 21, 2005, A1. 
 
Wise, Edward M., Podgor, Ellen S., and Clark, Roger S., International Criminal Law 
Cases and Materials, 2nd Edition, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., LexisNexis, 2004.  
p. 319-363, 513-543. 
 
Zaid, Mark S., “Military Might vs. Sovereign Rights, The Kidnapping of Dr. Machain,” 
Houston International Law Journal, University of Houston, 19 Hous. J. Int’l L. 829, 1997. 
 
 
 
94 
Cases (Listed By Year): 
• 1804 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170  
• 1872 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 
• 1875 Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 
• 1886 Ker v.People of the States of  Illinois, 119 US 436 
• 1925 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
• 1927 France v. Turkey, P.C.I.J. No. 10  
• 1934 Voight v. Toombs, 5th Cir., 67 F.2d 744 
• 1934 Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398  
• 1936 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
• 1942 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
• 1945 Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., S.D. Cal. 60 F.Supp. 985 
• 1946 Lovett v. United States, Ct. of Claims 66 F. Supp. 142, aff’d on other 
grounds, 328 U.S. 303 
• 1948 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 
• 1949 Chandler v. United States,1st Cir.171 F.2d 921  
• 1949 United Kingdom v. Albania (Corfu Case), I.C.J. 1  
• 1952 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 
• 1952 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
• 1957 Wentz v. United States,CA9 Cal,  244 F2d 172 
• 1957 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 
• 1962 Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichman, 36 I.L.R. 5  
• 1967 Rivard v. United States, 5th Cir., 375 F.2d 882, 887 
• 1969 Charron v. United States, 9th Cir., 412 F.2d 657 
• 1970 United States v. Zammiello, 9th Cir., 432 F.2d 72 
• 1971 Bacon v. United States, 9th Cir., 449 F.2d 933 
• 1971 Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971. 
• 1973 United States v. Vicars, 5th Cir., 467 F.2d 452 
• 1974 United States v. Toscanino, 2nd Cir., 500 F.2d 267 
• 1974 United States v. Herrara, 5th Cir., 504 F.2d 859 
• 1975 United States v. Quesada, 5th Cir., 512 F.2d 1043 
• 1975 United States v. Winter,5th Cir., 509 F.2d 975 
• 1975 United States v. Lovato, 9th Cir., 520 F.2d 1270 
• 1975 Gertstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 
• 1975 Lujan v. Gengler, 2nd Cir., 510 F.2d 62 
• 1975 United States v. Lira, 2nd Cir., 515 F.2d 68 
• 1975 Waits v. McGowan, 3rd Cir., 516 F.2d 203 
• 1976 Stone v. Powell, 428 US 465 
• 1976 United States v. Lara, 8th Cir., 424 US 382 
• 1976 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 
• 1977 United States v. Marzano, 7th Cir. 537 F.2d 257 
• 1977 United States v. Yanagita, 2nd Cir., 552 F.2d 940 
• 1978 Wirth v. Surles, 4th Cir., 562 F.2d 319 
• 1979 McBride v. Soos, 7th Cir., 594 F.2d 610 
• 1979 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 996 
• 1979 United States v. Sorren, 1st Cir., 605 F.2d 1211 
 
95 
• 1980 United States v. Valot, 9th Cir., 625 F.2d 308 
• 1980 United States v. Crews, 445 US 463 
• 1980 United States v. Ricardo, 5th Cir., 619 F.2d 1124  
• 1981 United States v. Cordero, 1st Cir., 42 F.3d 697 
• 1981 United States v. Reed, 2nd Cir., 639 F.2d 896 
• 1981 United States v. Fielding, 9th Cir., 645 F.2d 719 
• 1981 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
• 1982 David v. Attorney General, 7th Cir., 699 F.2d 411 
• 1984 Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d. 1308  
• 1985 United States v. Darby, 11th Cir., 744 F. 2d 1508 
• 1986 United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 
• 1987 United States v. Rosenthal, 11th Cir., 793 F.2d 1214 
• 1988 United States v. Yunis, D.C. Cir., 924 F.2d 1086 
• 1990 Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 7th Cir., 896 F.2d 255 
• 1990 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 
• 1990 United States v. Noriega, SDFla., 746 F.Supp. 1506 
• 1991 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company, 499 U.S. 244, 114 L.Ed.2d 274, 
11 S.Ct. 1227.  
• 1991 United States v. Pelaez, 6th Cir., 930 F.2d 520 
• 1992 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 
• 1992 United States v. Lazore 
• 1997 United States v. Noriega-MIllan, 1st Cir., 110 F.3d 162 
• 1998 United States v. Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d 601 
• 2001 United States v. Bridgewater, D. Puerto Rico, 175 F.Supp.2d 131  
• 2001 United States v. bin Ladin, S.D.N.Y., 132 F.Supp.2d 168 
• 2003 Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 E. H. R. R. 19  
• 2004 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 
• 2004 Rasul v. United States, 72 U.S.L.W 4596 
• 2004 Hamdi et al v. Rumsfeld et al, 542 US 507  
 
 
